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ABSTRACT
LEARNING ABOUT OTHERS DYNAMICALLY CHANGES BEHAVIOR AND THE
BRAIN
Ariana Familiar
Sharon Thompson-Schill
Humans are social beings. The ability to interact socially requires associating perceptual
and social information about other people. While prior work has elucidated the cognitive
and neural basis of general social knowledge, less is known about how person-specific
information is learned and remembered. The goal of this dissertation was to explore how
learning associations between visual and abstract information could influence conceptual
representations of specific individuals. Across three studies people learned social and
reward values associated with different faces. Chapter 2 examined how the learned values
influenced explicit judgments by measuring behavioral face similarity spaces before and
after learning. While pre-learning spaces were structured by the visual similarity of the
faces, social values selectively determined the post-learning spatial organization, and
generalized to expectations of behavior in a future social context. Chapter 3 investigated
the neural correlates of the face-value associations. Using functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI), brain activity patterns were measured while participants viewed faces
and performed a task unrelated to the values, once before and once after learning. A
region in the left anterior temporal lobe (ATL) had activity patterns that were biased by
the social values after learning, such that faces of more similar social values evoked more
similar activity patterns, and the magnitude of these learning-induced changes was
directly related to an individual’s learning performance as a function of value type.
Additionally, activity pattern similarity in the left inferior parietal lobe (IPL) tracked the
spatial organization of individual behavioral similarity spaces after learning. Chapter 4
assessed whether there were perceptual consequences of such behavioral and neural
modulations and whether effects were domain-general. A categorical perception
iii

paradigm was used to test whether learned values implicitly influenced face
discrimination. Preliminary evidence indicated that both social and reward values
affected discrimination performance for face and flower stimuli, however the effect of
social values did not persist over a long-term delay and was susceptible to task order
effects. Together, this work indicates that learned associations between visual and social
attributes of other people can warp behavioral and neural representations, and such
changes have downstream consequences on face perception and social preferences.
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I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
To interact with one’s environment and other agents, people must flexibly
incorporate knowledge gleaned from past experience with the information available in
their surroundings. Conceptual knowledge scaffolds this ability, and is structured by
concrete information derived from sensory and motor sources (e.g., knowledge of
objects, places, people, animals and their properties) as well as abstract information that
cannot be directly tied to a physical state or referent (e.g., justice, love, consciousness,
selfishness). It is perhaps unsurprising that recent advances in research on conceptual
knowledge in the mind and brain have mainly focused on concrete concepts, as their
properties are based in sensorial experience and in turn are quantifiable and comparable
by their physical attributes. Abstract concepts are no less relevant to human cognition
than concrete ones, however they can be harder to pin down and their format remains
heavily debated (Borghi et al., 2017; Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012).
One avenue for studying the cognitive and neural basis of abstract concepts is to
examine the ways in which they can be tied to perceivable information. Some would even
go as far as claiming that all concepts are fundamentally grounded in and depend on
perceptual and motor systems (Matheson & Barsalou, 2018; but see Mahon, 2015). On
the flip side of the same coin, perceptual representations are often imbued with
conceptual associations acquired through experience, and elucidating interactions
between perceptually-derived and abstract information is crucial for understanding the
organization of conceptual knowledge and how it may change over time. Focusing on
conceptual structures that involve visual attributes is a particularly intriguing way to
probe such associations, as we typically must parse and make meaning of the rich and
varied visual input relayed from the retina. Moreover, a large body of literature has
established the cognitive and neural organization of hierarchically constructed visual
representations (Hochstein & Ahissar, 2002; Cavanagh, 2011), providing the groundwork
for examining how such visual information can be integrated with other information
types.
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The overarching motivation of this dissertation is to explore how learning
associations between visual and abstract information can influence representations
initially organized by perceptual information. To examine this, I focus on person-specific
knowledge. Social behavior necessitates the inference of abstract social properties (e.g.,
personality traits, social categories, mental states of others) and the association of these
attributes with perceptual information about others (e.g., face identity, voice), which
people are typically able to do flexibly and with ease. That said, it remains to be
established how such distinct pieces of information about other individuals become
linked.
This is not to ignore the past several decades of research on social cognition,
social perception, and social neuroscience. Indeed, significant advancements have been
made in the study of social behaviors, such as inferring the mental states of others, the
influence of social stereotypes on behavior, social impressions of others’ faces, as well as
the relevant brain systems and downstream consequences at a societal-level (Adolphs,
2006; Frith & Frith, 2012; Frith, 2007; Rule et al., 2013). Work in the realm of social
perception has examined the properties and categories by which judgments of social
attributes, such as personality traits and group membership, are made based on visual
information. Research in this area has found remarkable consistency in observers’
evaluations of faces along social trait dimensions (e.g., judging how kind a face appears),
even when presented with an image of a face for only a fraction of a second (Todorov et
al., 2015). Perceptual features based on facial morphology have been found to predict
social impressions of faces, and interestingly the underlying dimensions that explain a
large amount of variance in these judgments (i.e., dominance and trustworthiness;
Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008) are comparable to those that structure more abstract, higherlevel social judgments such as group categories and associated stereotypes (i.e.,
competence and warmth; Fiske et al., 2007). Recent studies have built on these findings
by showing how social perception can be dependent on the stimulus, context, and
perceiver (Todorov & Porter, 2014; Sutherland et al., 2017; Mileva et al., 2019) and
depend on the general conceptual beliefs of the observer (Stolier et al., 2018a,b; Stolier et
al., 2020).
2

The vast majority of these studies, however, have focused on categorical
judgments of unfamiliar others. Arguably more important in daily life and more
important for understanding person knowledge is our memory for specific individuals
with whom we are familiar with compared to those who are strangers. There is some
evidence that social perception differs when we have additional knowledge about others.
For example, one recent study found that trait judgments of famous faces were less
influenced by image-based variation than unfamiliar faces (Mileva et al., 2019). At the
same time, studies on memory for familiar others have been primarily restricted to
episodic memory (Maddock et al., 2001), mental imagery (Ishai et al., 2002; Thornton &
Mitchell, 2017), or more fundamental aspects of face perception (Burton et al., 2011;
Visconti di Oleggio Castello et al., 2017; Elfgren et al., 2006). Neuropsychological
studies on patients with progressive brain damage have implicated a dissociation of
person-specific and more general semantic knowledge (Kay & Hanley, 1999; Thompson
et al., 2004; Predovan et al., 2014), and some neuroimaging studies have studied the
neural correlates of person-specific knowledge but have focused on associations between
faces and biographical information such as name, job, or age (Tsukiura et al., 2010;
Wang et al., 2017).
1.1 Current approach
It remains to be established how abstract social properties are associated with
perceptual information about specific individuals. Across three chapters, I investigate
how learned associations between social traits and face identities can modulate the
structure of cognitive and neural representations of faces and related influences on
behavior.
Cognitive representations of information can be defined as multi-dimensional
spaces (Shepard, 1980). Distinct points in this space correspond to unique items, and the
distance between items is determined by the similarity of their attributes.
Representational spaces can be constructed based on explicit judgements of similarity
made by subjects. Similarity judgments have been used in many areas of psychology and
3

can be informative in describing how people perceive and assess items and make
decisions (Goldstone & Son, 2012). Similarity spaces can also be defined with neural or
model-derived responses to items, allowing for comparisons of information structures
between seemingly disparate measurement techniques. The validity and relevance of
similarity in defining models of cognitive processes has been debated (Murphy & Medin,
1985; Goldstone, 1994a; Goldstone & Son, 2012), however, research on the mental and
neural representations of conceptual knowledge have benefited from comparing
behavioral, neural, and model-based similarity spaces and their underlying dimensions
(Kriegeskorte et al., 2008, Kriegeskorte & Kievit, 2013). Here, I intend to use similarity
measures as a tool to probe people’s mental structures of information.
In Chapter 1, I use similarity judgments among a set of faces to test whether and
how learned social traits (social values) and task rewards (reward values) can change an
observer’s mental ‘face space’ representation and the spatial relationships between faces.
Furthermore, I examine how changes in behavioral similarity are related to learning, and
how they generalize to participants’ expectations in a future social context. This study
establishes how learning visual-abstract associations can bias representations of face
identities and how these biases may differ across perceivers.
In Chapter 2, I study the relationship between behavioral and neural face spaces
and how they are influenced by learning face-value associations. Using functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA), I examine
whether learning associations between faces, social, and reward information influences
the similarity of responses to different faces in the visual system, and test recent
proposals that social information biases responses to faces at early (Olson et al., 2013)
and late (Freeman & Ambady, 2011; Stolier & Freeman, 2017) stages of the ventral
visual processing pathway. This elucidates whether learned associations can influence
conceptual structures of visual information in the brain.
In Chapter 3, implicit behavioral changes beyond the value learning task are
assessed. Specifically, I examine whether the re-organization of face spaces due to
learned associations has an impact on perceptual discrimination. I utilize a paradigm from
the categorical perception literature, which has established that learned categorical
4

groupings of stimuli influences discrimination performance as a function of group
membership, suggestive of changes in the underlying representational space for those
items. This study investigates whether representational changes due to value learning
influence behavior in a value-irrelevant perceptual discrimination task. Moreover, the
domain-generality of these effects are examined by testing an inanimate object in
addition to the face stimuli.
The present work builds on existing literature in cognition and perception by
focusing on how learning about other people can dynamically change underlying
information structures. Each chapter assesses modulations at both the group-level, as well
as at the individual-level, to better understand the heterogeneity in how people acquire
and utilize different sources of information. Additionally, in each chapter I use a
paradigm in which people interactively learn about others, as opposed to merely
providing them explicit labels, to implement a learning context in which participants
must infer social properties about other people over multiple events. In sum, this research
contributes to our understanding of the behavioral and neural underpinnings of visualabstract associations in person knowledge.
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II. LEARNING SOCIAL VALUES MODULATES FACE
SIMILARITY AND SOCIAL EXPECTATIONS
1. Introduction
Humans possess the remarkable ability to learn about hundreds of other people
and objects. One important piece of information about encountered items is their value,
which often becomes associated through positive and negative experiences. Values can
be defined as concepts or beliefs that guide human perception and behavior (Allport,
1961; Schwartz, 1992). In this way, values are motivational constructs that can lead one
to obtain desirable goals and behavioral outcomes. Remembering and comparing values
of alternate choices is crucial to making decisions. While values of items can be
monetary, they are often more abstract in nature. Arguably one of the most biologically
relevant values are social values that are associated with other people, such as personality
traits that inform social behavior. For instance, a high social value would correspond to
individuals that have positive prosocial traits (e.g., generous), and low social value to
those with negative prosocial traits (e.g., selfish). Extracting and encoding social values
based on interactions with others is essential for social behavior across different
environmental situations, as they can be used to assess and predict the behavior of others
(Frith & Frith, 2012; Rilling & Sanfey, 2011; Ruff & Fehr, 2014).
Importantly, in order to utilize social values associated with other people, one
must link learned values with additional knowledge about a person. This can consist of
perceptual information, such as their visual appearance and the sound of their voice, as
well as semantic information like names and personal characteristics. Learning,
remembering, and updating information about others is essential for understanding past
behavior and using it to generate expectations of future actions. Notably, this involves
interactions between the cognitive processes that allow us to recognize someone, and
those that support memory of the person and our past interactions with them. Here, we
focus on associations between visual face identity, as it is a readily available perceptual
cue to recognize an individual, and social traits, as they can inform realistic evaluations
of other people and guide interactions with them (Lee, 2008).
6

In the realm of face processing, there has been ample research on social
impressions of unfamiliar faces. It is well-established that social trait categories can be
perceived rapidly during face perception (Todorov, Olivola, Dotsch, & Mende-Siedlecki,
2015; Todorov, 2017). For example, judgments of race, gender, emotional expressions,
and personality traits can occur at a fraction of a second (Adolphs, 2006; Willis &
Todorov, 2006; Kubota & Ito, 2016). Moreover, people infer personality traits of
unfamiliar faces, such as competence, intelligence, aggressiveness, and trustworthiness,
with significant consensus, even when presented with a face for only 100 ms (Willis &
Todorov, 2006; Todorov, 2008; Bar, Neta, & Linz, 2006; Hassin & Trope, 2000). It has
been found that such trait impressions are linked to physical facial features, such as the
shape of a face’s mouth or brow (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; Todorov & Oosterhof,
2011; Berry & McArthur, 1986; Montepare & Zebrowitz, 1998; Todorov et al., 2015;
Zebrowitz, 2017). Importantly, these impressions have been shown to be related to social
outcomes, such as how we evaluate and treat others, and how we expect them to act
(Hassin & Trope, 2000; Hehman, Stolier, Freeman, Flake, & Xie, 2019; Todorov et al.,
2015). For example, perceived competence and dominance have been shown to predict
behavior in political elections and leadership selection (Todorov, Mandisodza, Goren, &
Hall, 2005; Ballew & Todorov, 2007; Lenz & Lawson, 2011; Antonakis & Eubanks,
2017), criminal sentencing (Zebrowitz & McDonald, 1991), as well as success in one’s
career (Graham, Harvey, & Puri, 2017; Rule & Ambady, 2011; but see, Stoker,
Garretsen, & Spreeuwers, 2016). Taken together, social information can be gleaned
rapidly during perception based on facial appearance, and resulting social trait
impressions have significant behavioral consequences.
One method of operationalizing the behaviorally relevant information associated
with visual stimuli such as faces is by constructing spaces that represent relationships
between them (Goldstone, 1994b). Distances in representational spaces reflect the
similarity between items, such that more similar stimuli along a given dimension are
closer together. The dimensions of these spaces can be defined by properties relevant to
distinguishing between items and to quantifying meaningful groupings (categories).
Advantages of using such an approach include the ability to define the relationships of a
7

set of stimuli to one another using multiple dimensions, as well as to compare
representational spaces across measurement modalities (e.g., model-defined and
behaviorally-defined spaces; Kriegeskorte et al., 2008; Kriegeskorte & Kievit, 2013;
Groen et al., 2018). In the case of social impressions, spatial dimensions have typically
been defined by facial features that vary continuously and correlate with perceived social
traits (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; Todorov & Oosterhof, 2011). In this way, face spaces
defined by former studies have been structured by perceptual information, as the
variations between faces are the visual properties related to social judgments.
Previous work in social perception has linked perceptual face spaces to first
impressions of unfamiliar faces and has found that resulting trait judgments are directly
predicted by the facial features of a face. At the same time, social information associated
with face identities is influenced by experience. It is certainly not the case that a coworker is forever perceived as dominant and aggressive merely due to their prominent
brow; instead, trait judgements are adaptively updated through learning contexts such as
firsthand interactions or knowledge of other social categories to which they belong (e.g.,
their profession or nationality; Jenkins et al., 2018; Rosenberg et al., 1968). This begs the
question of whether perceptual face spaces can be modulated by learning such traits. It
remains to be established how such spaces may become re-organized when associated
social traits are learned and how they are related to behavior beyond initial impressions of
unfamiliar faces.
In the present study, we examine whether and how learned values can influence
face similarity spaces. Participants performed a value learning task over the course of
four days in which they learned social (generosity) and reward (point) values associated
with different faces. Additionally, they made similarity judgments once before and once
after learning. Although explicitly told to judge similarity, participants were free to use
whatever information they believed relevant for making their judgments. After value
learning, we also measured participants’ preferences for being paired with each person
(face) on a separate cooperative task if invited back for another study, and examined
whether any face space changes due to the learned values generalized to such future
expectations of social behavior. Specifically, we examined the types of information
8

participants used to make similarity comparisons (perceptual, social value, and/or reward
value), how they generalized to social preferences, and whether individual differences in
learning for each value type was related to behavioral similarity and preference
judgments.
We focus on the social trait of generosity, as it can communicate trustworthiness
(Klapwijk & Van Lange, 2009), and trustworthiness has been shown to be a particularly
relevant cognitive dimension underlying trait inferences during face perception
(Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; Willis & Todorov, 2006; Todorov, Pakrashi, & Oosterhof,
2009). Instead of having participants judge traits based on facial features, they learned
about traits associated with stimuli through a cover task. They played a game in which
they learned about point allocations made by other players. The proportion of point pools
donated on average, as well as the magnitude of points donated on average, were varied
across players (modified from Hackel, Doll, & Amodio, 2015). In other words,
participants learned that different players were more or less generous (social values) and
had more or less points to give (reward values). Participants were instructed to maximize
the points the received from the players by learning these values. Importantly, the social
and reward values were orthogonally assigned to the stimuli, so that social values were
not confounded with behavioral task salience and the effects of each value type could be
examined separately.
The goal of this study is to establish whether behavioral face spaces are
modulated by learning associations between faces and values. If the organization of face
space is influenced by learned values, it would show that this information can influence
face judgments when values are learned through experience and are not based solely on
initial impressions. This would support the notion that representational spaces can be
dynamically modulated by experience and would underscore the malleability of face-trait
representations.

9

2. Experiment 1
2.1 Materials and Methods
2.1.1 Participants
Thirty-four subjects were recruited from the University of Pennsylvania, four
were excluded due to low accuracy on the learning task, resulting in thirty subjects in the
dataset (6 male; ages 18-30 years). All subjects gave written informed consent within a
protocol approved by the IRB at the University of Pennsylvania and were financially
compensated for their time.
2.1.2 Stimuli
Nine monochrome face images were chosen from the Psychological Image
Collection at Stirling database (pics.stir.ac.uk), all consisting of a single front-facing face
with a neutral expression. Images were cropped with an oval mask to only include the
center of each face (minimizing details such as hair, ears, etc.), and matched in mean
luminance using the SHINE Toolbox (Willenbockel et al., 2010). We chose faces of the
same race and gender (Caucasian male) and of similar ages in order to minimize any
effects of these socially relevant dimensions. That said, it is still possible for the faces to
vary by these and other perceived characteristic traits, such as friendliness, attractiveness,
etc. As perceptual aspects of facial appearance have been shown to predict initial trait
judgments across individuals (see Introduction), we aimed to control for these factors by
collecting perceptual similarity judgments from a separate group of participants (see
description of procedure below). We used these judgments to orthogonalize the measured
perceptual similarity with the values assigned to the faces, and to control for perceptual
similarity in the data analysis.
2.1.3 Value Learning Procedure
A modified version of the task used in Hackel, Doll, & Amodio (2015) was
conducted online using PsyToolkit (Stoet, 2017) over four consecutive days. Participants
10

were recruited under the impression that they would be randomly assigned to either a
social choice or a social learning role, however all were assigned to a social learning role.
After this assignment, participants were told that during training, they would learn about
the actions of other ‘players’ assigned to the social choice role, who allocated a pool of
points between themselves and a future player (the participant). On a given trial,
participants chose one of two players, presented side by side on a computer screen. To
make a choice, participants pressed one of two keys to indicate the player on the left (Fkey) or the player on the right (J-key); they had 2 seconds to respond before the next trial
commenced (inter-trial-interval of 3 seconds). Upon choosing, they were presented with
feedback for 3 seconds about how many points that player gave them and the point pool
the player was allocated on that trial (Figure 2.1). If no choice was made, no feedback
was presented.
Participants were instructed to maximize their accrued points, as the total number
of points they earn amounted to a cash bonus. Moreover, they were told that some players
were given more points on average to allocate (reward value), and some gave a higher
proportion of their point pool on average (social value), so they would have to learn about
both sources of information over the course of training in order to maximize their total
points.
On average, players shared 20, 50, or 80% of their point pool, which was either
15, 45, or 75 points. On a given trial, noise was added to these values by randomly
selecting a value from a normal distribution centered on zero (standard deviation of 5 for
point values, 5% for generosity values) and adding it to the average value for that face.
Point pools were calculated by dividing the point value by the generosity value for that
trial. Participants completed about an hour of training each day (288 trials per session),
for four days, and were shown their accrued number of points at the end of each session.
Social values (average proportion of point pool shared) and reward (average
magnitude of points shared) values were orthogonally assigned to the faces as follows.
Pairwise differences in perceptual similarity were calculated (described below), and
combinations of social and reward values were assigned to the faces such that they were
orthogonal to perceptual similarity, and orthogonal to one another (Fig. 2.S1-S2). This
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allowed us to examine the effect of each value type separately, while controlling for
perceptual similarity.
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Figure 2.1
Value learning paradigm. (Top) Example of one trial in the learning task, participants
saw two faces simultaneously and chose to play with one of the two players. If they made
a choice within the allotted time (max. 2 seconds), they received feedback about how
many points they received on that trial from the chosen player (labeled “Shared”) and
how many points in that players point pool for that trial (labeled “Out of”). (Bottom)
value assignments for the nine faces. Each player had one social value (average percent
of point pool shared) and one reward value (average point magnitude shared), and values
were orthogonalized across the faces.
2.1.4 Free Sorting Similarity Tasks
2.1.4.1 Behavioral Similarity. A free sorting task was used to quantify
conceptual similarity spaces before and after learning (Goldstone, 1994b). Participants
were shown the nine face images on a white background and were instructed to organize
the images in a spatial manner that reflected their similarity. The closer together the
images were in space, the more similar the people depicted were, and the farther apart,
the more dissimilar. There were no time constraints on the completion of the task, and
people were instructed to use whatever information they thought was relevant to make
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their judgements. Participants performed the task once before the learning task on the
first day of learning, and once after completing the value learning task on the last day of
learning.
2.1.4.2 Perceptual Similarity. A separate group of 20 participants performed the
same free sorting task for course credit, however they were explicitly instructed to
organize the images in a manner that reflected the perceptual similarity of the faces.
2.1.5 Post-Learning Ratings
At the end of the last learning session, participants completed the following
ratings, conducted using Qualtrics.
2.1.5.1 Social Value Ranking. Participants were instructed to rank the players in
order of their overall generosity in the social choice role (i.e., the average proportion of
their point pool shared). They were presented with the nine faces in a random order, and
then clicked and dragged the images to reposition them until they were satisfied with the
ranking.
2.1.5.2 Reward Value Ranking. This task was the same as the social value
ranking except the participants were instructed to rank the players in order of their overall
points donated in the social choice role (i.e., how many points the players gave to the
participant on average). Data from two participants did not save properly and so all
reported analyses involving this measure are based on the remaining twenty-eight
subjects.
2.1.5.3 Social Preferences. Participants were told they may be invited back for an
additional study involving a cooperative non-monetary task and we would accommodate
preferences for people to be paired together. They were instructed to indicate their
preference to be paired with the other players on that task (based on Hackel, Doll, &
Amodio, 2015). For each face image, participants rated on a scale of 1-7 how much they
preferred to be paired with that player (1 = not at all; 7 = definitely yes).
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2.2 Results
2.2.1 Value learning performance
In order to have participants learn associations between values and faces, they
completed four days of a value learning task for about one hour per day (modified from
Hackel, Doll, & Amodio, 2015). Over the four days, participants learned social values
(average percentage of points donated) and reward values (average magnitude of points
donated) associated with nine faces (Fig. 2.1). For each day, accuracy for a value type
was calculated based on whether participants chose higher value faces on trials in which
the two faces differed on that value type but not on the other type (chance = 50%). For
example, social accuracy for a trial was determined by whether the higher social value
face was chosen, for two faces that had different social values (e.g., 20% and 80%) but
equal reward values (e.g., 15 points). A repeated measures ANOVA of accuracy (value
type x day) showed a significant effect of day (F(3, 87) = 4.17, p = .008) and interaction
between day and value type (F(3, 87) = 6.93, p < .001), with no effect of value type (F(3,
87) = 1.17, p = .289; Fig. 2.2, left). Paired t-tests indicated a significant increase in
reward accuracy between Day 1 (M = .59, SEM = .02) and Day 4 (M = .72, SEM = .04;
t(29) = 4.2, p < .001), but no change in social accuracy between these days (Day 1: M =
.76, SEM = .03; Day 4: M = .7, SEM = .03; t(29) = -1.54, p = .134). Additionally, social
accuracy was significantly higher than reward accuracy on Day 1 (t(29) = 4.36, p < .001),
but there was no difference between value types on Day 4 (t(29) = 0.42, p = .679).
These results indicate that accuracy for choosing faces based on their associated
reward values increased over the four days of learning, and across participants accuracy
was equivalent for the two value types at the end of learning. Interestingly, accuracy for
social values did not change across the four days at a group-level. In fact, choosing faces
based on their social values can be counter-productive to the goal of maximizing points
for the cash bonus if primarily prioritizing social over reward information (e.g., choosing
a high-social/low-reward over a low-social/high-reward face). Furthermore, it might be
expected that social values would be harder to learn than reward values, as reward values
are explicitly presented to participants in the trial feedback while social values have to be
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calculated based on the reward value and point pool information. Nonetheless, people
learned the social values and used them to guide their choices on the learning task.
Additionally, there were individual differences in accuracy for both value types
on Day 4, with some people having higher social than reward accuracy and others having
higher reward than social accuracy (Fig. 2.2, right). The group became more polarized in
these tendencies over the course of learning, with 24 of the 30 participants having higher
reward accuracy than social accuracy on Day 1, but only 15 on Day 4 (Fig. 2.S3).
Participants were also generally consistent in which value type they had higher accuracy
for on Days 2 – 4 (Fig. 2.S3).
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Figure 2.2
Value learning performance (N = 30). (Left) accuracy across participants for social (red)
and reward (blue) values separately, on each day of learning; error bars indicate +/- SEM.
(Right) accuracy for each value type on the last day of learning (Day 4), each point
represents one participant.

2.2.2 Behavioral judgments of face and value similarity
Having established that participants learned social and reward values associated
with the faces, we next examined whether and how value learning influenced the type of
information used to judge similarity of the faces. To measure this, we had participants
complete a free sorting task in which they generated similarity spaces with the face
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images. Participants simultaneously viewed the nine faces on a computer and arranged
the faces such that the spatial organization (distance) of the images reflected their
similarity (similar faces would be placed closer together, dissimilar faces would be
placed farther apart). There was no time constraint on this task, and participants
completed it once before the value learning task on the first day of learning (prelearning), and once after the learning task on the last day of learning (post-learning). We
did not instruct participants to use any specific types of information to make their
similarity judgments (e.g., perceptual or value-based), thus they were free to choose the
property(-ies) by which to make their responses.
To calculate perceived similarity of the faces, we computed the distance between
each pair of faces as the pixel-wise Euclidean distance between their centers. A higher
value indicates that the faces were perceived as more dissimilar. We then averaged the
distances for each pair of faces across participants, to construct a behavioral dissimilarity
matrix (DM) for pre- and post-learning spaces separately (Fig. 2.3). In order to examine
what information participants were using to structure their face spaces, we correlated the
pre- and post-learning behavioral DMs with DMs derived from other measures1. If the
DMs are positively correlated, then they are similarly structured. In other words, we can
conclude that the given type of information is related to how participants judged
similarity.
We first tested whether perceptual information, or physical face appearance, was
related to the behavioral similarity judgments. A separate group of participants (N = 20)
were explicitly told to complete the free sorting task using perceptual information to
judge the similarity of the faces. A perceptual DM was constructed using the pixel-wise
distance between faces, and averaging the pairwise distances across participants (note
that these results were used to orthogonalize perceptual similarity with the objective
social and reward similarity in the experimental design; Fig. 2.S1-S2). The pre-learning
behavioral DM was correlated with the perceptual DM (r(34) = .73, p < .001), but the
1

Spearman correlations were used when similarity values for at least one measure were not normally
distributed (determined by Shapiro-Wilk normality tests), otherwise Pearson correlations were utilized.
Partial correlations were performed on rank-transformed data due to non-normality.
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post-learning DM was not (although marginally related; r(34) = .31, p = .065; Fig. 2.S4),
and the difference between the correlations was significant (z = 2.76; Steiger, 1980). This
indicates that before value learning, participants used the visual appearance of the faces
to make their similarity judgments, but after learning perceptual similarity was not
determinate of the behavioral similarity space organization.

Pre-Learning

Post-Learning

Dissimilar

Similar

Figure 2.3
Behavioral similarity spaces. Illustration of dissimilarity matrix construction based on
distance between face pairs in similarity space, separately for pre-value learning (left)
and post-learning (right). Dissimilarity matrices (bottom) show the group-level results
(average across subject-level DMs).
Next, we compared the behavioral DM with DMs based explicit value rankings
that participants performed on the last day of value learning. Participants ranked the faces
from lowest to highest value, once for social values and once for reward values. DMs
were constructed based on the average difference in rank for face pairs across
participants. Subjective value DMs were correlated with objective (experimentallydefined) value DMs (social: rs(34) = .9, p < .001; reward: rs(34) = .68, p < .001; Fig.
2.S5) as well as one another (rs(34) = .47, p = .004). The subjective social DM was not
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correlated with the objective reward DM (subj-social/obj-reward: rs(34) = -.12, p = .475);
however, the subjective reward DM was correlated with both objective value DMs (subjreward/obj-social: rs(34) = .42, p = .01). An additional partial correlation analysis showed
the subjective and objective social value DMs were related even when controlling for
subjective reward similarity (r(33) = .88, p < .001). Subjective value DMs were not
related to perceptual similarity (social: rs(34) = -.16, p = .362; reward: rs(34) = -.22, p <
.192). Overall, this indicates that subjective value DMs were related to the objective
values associated with the faces.
The post-learning behavioral DM was positively correlated with the subjective
social value DM (partial r(33) = .47, p = .004, controlling for reward) but not reward
value DM (partial r(33) = .19, p = .265, controlling for social; Fig. 2.4). The pre-learning
behavioral DM was not correlated with either value DMs (social: r(33) = -.02, p = .929;
reward: r(33) = -.13, p = .457), and a test of the difference between dependent
correlations confirmed the correlations between social and post-learning DMs was greater
than the correlation between social and pre-learning DMs (z = 3.44). The same pattern of
results was found for the objective value DMs (Fig. 2.S6), with post-learning behavioral
similarity spaces relating to social (rs(34) = .53, p = .001) but not reward (rs(34) = .08, p
= .645) values, and neither value relating to pre-learning (social: rs(34) = -.19, p = .26;
reward: rs(34) = .1, p = .568). This shows that participants’ behavioral face spaces were
modulated by the learned social values, and not the reward values, such that faces of
similar social values became grouped together.
Last, we examined individual differences in behavioral space modulations and
value learning performance. Specifically, we tested whether an individual’s accuracy for
each value type on the last day of value learning was related to the influence of each
value on their behavioral similarity space judgments. We defined value learning
sensitivity as a participant’s social value accuracy minus their reward value accuracy. In
this way, a higher learning sensitivity corresponds to being more accurate at choosing
faces based on their social values compared to reward values (and vice versa). Behavioral
sensitivity was calculated as the difference in correlations between a participant’s value
rankings and the change in their behavioral similarity scores (for each face pair, the post18

learning distance minus pre-learning distance). A higher behavioral sensitivity value
corresponds to a greater relationship between the change in their similarity ratings and
their social value rankings, compared to their reward value rankings. The correlation
between learning sensitivity and behavioral sensitivity was marginally significant (r(28)
= .32, p = .1; Fig. 2.S7).
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Figure 2.4
Similarity comparisons. Group-level dissimilarity matrices based on behavioral free
sorting (upper) and value ranking (left) tasks (each cell corresponds to one face pair).
Scatter plots show relationship between DMs (each point represents one face pair, linear
trend line shown in black for visualization). The post-learning (right), but not prelearning (left), DM was related to the subjective social value DM (upper) but not reward
value (lower) DM.
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2.2.3 Generalization of learned value information to social preferences
To examine whether the learned value information generalized to a separate
context, we measured participants’ expectations of social behavior. At the end of learning
(after the value learning task on day 4), participants completed an additional task in
which they rated each face based on how much they would like to be paired with that
person if they were invited back for another study on cooperative problem-solving (based
on Hackel, Doll, & Amodio, 2015). This allowed us to study what types of information
participants used in their preferences in a future social context.
Value
Social
Reward

Level
High
Medium
Low
High
Medium
Low

M (SEM)
6.14 (0.16)
3.52 (0.18)
2.16 (0.17)
4.73 (0.16)
3.76 (0.15)
3.33 (0.16)

Table 2.1
Preference ratings for each value type and value level (averaged over the other value
type; N = 30).
A repeated-measures ANOVA on preference ratings for each face showed
significant effects of the objective social (F(2, 58) = 112.6, p < .001) and reward values
(F(1.6, 46.51) = 19.32, p < .001, Greenhouse-Giesser corrected) on ratings, with no
interaction between the value types (F(2.29, 66.29) = 0.75, p = .493, Greenhouse-Giesser
corrected; Fig. 2.5, left)2. Averaging over the different reward values, high social value
faces were the most preferred, and low social values the least (Table 2.1).
A preference similarity measure was calculated as the difference in preference
ratings for each pair of faces. The corresponding preference rating DM was strongly
correlated with the DM based on the social value rankings (partial r(33) = .93, p < .001

2

Each subjects’ ratings were normalized to the range of 1 – 7 prior to all analyses.
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controlling for reward; Fig. 2.S8, upper), and marginally correlated with the reward value
DM (partial r(33) = .28, p = .1 controlling for social). The same trend was found when
comparing preference and objective value DMs (social: rs(34) = .86, p < .001; reward:
rs(34) = -.02, p = .896; Fig. 2.S8, lower). There was also a positive relationship between
preference and post-learning DMs (r(34) = .61, p < .001), but not pre-learning distances
(r(34) = -.05, p = .754), and there was a significance difference between these
correlations (z = 3.6; Fig. 2.S8, middle). Preference similarity was not related to
perceptual similarity (r(34) = -.04, p = .838). Together, this indicates that at a group-level
faces of more similar social values shared similar preference scores.
Next, we sought to compare individual differences in sensitivity to social and
reward information in the preference ratings to individual biases for these values during
the learning task. To test whether participants made their preference ratings based on
social and/or reward information, we derived a preference sensitivity measure as follows.
For each participant and value type, the average rating for low value faces was subtracted
from the average rating for high value faces (social/reward sensitivity). Then the reward
sensitivity value was subtracted from the social sensitivity value.
Preference sensitivity = (mean(high-social) – mean(low-social)) –
(mean(high-reward) – mean(low-reward))

This resulted in a preference sensitivity value corresponding to how much a participant
differentiated between faces based on each value type in their ratings. A positive value
corresponds to greater sensitive to social values than reward values. Across participants,
preference sensitivity was positive on average (M = 2.58, SEM = 0.5). Comparing
preference sensitivity with Day 4 learning sensitivity, there was a marginally significant
positive correlation (rs(28) = .35, p = .055; Fig. 2.5, right).
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Figure 2.5
Social preference rating results. Across participants, preference ratings were highest for
high value faces and lowest for low value faces (left; error bars indicate +/- SEM), there
was a significant effect of each value type on ratings. Individual sensitivity to social and
reward values in the preference ratings was positively related to accuracy for each value
type on day 4 of learning (right; each point represents one subject, black line indicates
linear trend).

3. Experiment 2
In order to validate the results from Experiment 1, a separate group of participants
completed the same study in order to test reproducibility. All aspects of this experiment
were the same with the following exceptions: (1) prior to completing any of the
behavioral tasks Experiment 1 subjects also participated in a neuroimaging (fMRI)
portion of the study in which they viewed the face images and performed a repeat
detection task; and (2) Experiment 1 subjects were paid for their participation and were
given a cash bonus based on their performance during value learning, whereas
Experiment 2 subjects received no monetary compensation for their participation or task
performance.
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3.1 Methods
3.1.1 Participants
Twenty participants (three males, ages 18-22) were recruited from the University
of Pennsylvania. All subjects gave written informed consent within a protocol approved
by the IRB at the University of Pennsylvania and received course credit for their time.
3.1.2 Stimuli & Procedure
All stimuli and procedures were the same as in Experiment 1.
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Value learning performance
Just as in Experiment 1, a correct response on a given trial was choosing the
player with the higher assigned value, when the other value types were equal. Accuracy
(percent correct) was computed across trials within a session. If no response was made
during a trial, that trial was not included in the analysis (2% excluded trials, across
participants and across sessions).
A repeated measures ANOVA of accuracy (value type x day) showed a
significant effect of day (F(3, 57) = 10.45, p < .001) and interaction between day and
value type (F(3, 57) = 7.75, p < .001), with no effect of value type (F(1, 19) = 0.15, p =
.706). Paired t-tests indicated a significant increase in reward accuracy between Day 1 (M
= .59, SEM = .03) and Day 4 (M = .77, SEM = .05; t(19) = 4.76, p < .001; Fig. 2.6, left),
but no change in social accuracy between these days (Day 1: M = .74, SEM = .04; Day 4:
M = .68, SEM = .04; t(19) = -1.49, p = .152). Additionally, social accuracy was
significantly higher than reward accuracy on Day 1 (t(19) = 3.4, p = .0013, but there was
no difference between value types on Day 4 (t(19) = -1.24, p = .229). Together, these
results replicate Experiment 1.
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Figure 2.6
Value learning performance. Average accuracy for social (red) and reward (blue) value
on each day of learning (left; error bars indicate +/- SEM). Individual learning accuracy
on day 4 for each value type (right; each point corresponds to one subject).
3.2.2 Behavioral similarity
Subjective and objective social DMs were positively correlated (rs(34) = .43, p =
.009). Unlike in Experiment 1, the subjective reward DM did not correlate with objective
reward (rs(34) = -.15, p = .39), but like Experiment 1 it correlated with the subjective
(r(34) = .35, p = .008) and objective (rs(34) = .45, p = .006) social DMs.
The post-learning behavioral DM was positively correlated with the social value
DMs (subjective: partial r(34) = .65, p < .001, controlling for reward; objective: rs(34) =
.45, p = .006; Fig. 2.7, right) but not the reward value DMs (subjective: partial r(34) = .17, p = .341; controlling for social; objective: rs(34) = .15, p = .391), while the prelearning DM did not correlate with DMs for either value type (subjective social: r(34) =
.19, p = .281; objective social: rs(34) = .026, p = .878; subjective reward: r(34) = .02, p =
.887; objective reward: rs(34) = -.16, p = .355), and the difference in correlations between
post- and pre-learning with subjective social similarity was significant (z = 2.62).
The perceptual DM was only correlated with the pre-learning behavioral DM
(r(34) = .59, p < .001; Fig. 2.7, left) and no other DM (Table 2.S1). The relationship
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between individual behavioral sensitivity and day 4 learning sensitivity was not
significant (r(18) = -.25, p = .285).
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Figure 2.7
Modulation of behavioral face similarity (free sorting) by learned social values. Before
value learning, behavioral similarity was related to the perceptual similarity of the faces
(left), while after learning similarity was related to social (right), but not reward (not
shown), similarity. Each point represents one face pair, black line indicates linear trend.

3.2.3 Social preferences
Social preference ratings also followed a similar trend as in Experiment 1, with
high social value faces being the most preferred and low social value faces the least (Fig.
2.8, left; Table 2.S2). A repeated-measures ANOVA of preference ratings (value type x
value level) showed significant effects of social (F(1.39, 26.37) = 25.53, p < .001,
Greenhouse-Giesser corrected) and reward (F(1.36, 25.77) = 13.28, p < .001,
Greenhouse-Giesser corrected) values, but no interaction (F(4, 76) = .51, p = .729),
replicating the results found in Experiment 1.
The social preference DM was correlated with the social (subjective: partial r(33)
= .71, p < .001; objective: rs(34) = .54, p = .001), but not reward (subjective: partial r(33)
= -.22, p = .204; objective rs(34) = -.22, p = .203), DMs.
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Like in Experiment 1, the individual differences analysis comparing learning
sensitivity on day 4 with preference sensitivity showed a positive correlation that was
marginally significant (r(18) = .37, p = .106; Fig. 2.8, right).
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Figure 2.8
Social preference results. Group-level results as a function of value type (left; error bars
represent +/- SEM), and individual differences in sensitivity to each value type in the
preference ratings and learning accuracy on day 4 (each point represents one subject;
black line indicates linear trend).

4. General Discussion
In this study, we examined how learned values (social traits and reward points)
influence similarity space representations of facial identities. We were particularly
interested in testing whether perceptually organized spaces could be re-organized by
learning associations between visual and non-visual information. While previous studies
had established that perceptually defined face spaces are related to initial trait
impressions of unfamiliar faces, it remained to be examined whether learning trait
information associated with faces could re-organize perceptual spaces.
We found that before learning, the organization of similarity spaces was
determined by the perceptual similarity of the faces, such that faces that were more
perceptually similar were closer together. After learning, perceptual similarity no longer
determined the distances between faces, and instead social values, but not reward values,
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influenced the structure of face space. Notably the task instructions were to arrange the
faces such that their spatial organization reflected their similarity, and subjects were not
explicitly told to use any specific piece of information to make their judgments. These
results replicated across two separate groups of subjects, and show how learned social
information about a person can modulate representations of their facial identity.
That social, and not reward values, influenced behavioral similarity result was
surprising given the design of the value learning task. In order to maximize accrued
points over the course of learning, which in Experiment 1 amounted to a cash bonus at
the end of the experiment, it was in the participants’ interest to focus on the reward
values. In other words, by choosing faces based on the average points they were donating
to the participant, they could choose the faces that would give them more points on
average. Instead, by the end of learning about half of the participants were better at
choosing faces based on their social values compared to reward values. This was not
likely due to an inability to learn the reward values, as group-level reward value accuracy
increased over the four days, was significantly above chance, and participants were able
to correctly rank the faces based on their reward values on the last day of learning in
Experiment 1 (although this was not found in Experiment 2). Additionally, participants
could have used either or both value types to judge similarity, but instead they used social
value alone. That these learned social traits were selectively integrated into face spaces
suggests that the social value information was more behaviorally relevant to the
participants’ judgements of similarity. Put alternatively, when determining what
properties to use to discern between the faces, participants prioritized social over reward
information. It mattered less to them that a person gave them more points than another,
but more so whether they were more or less generous with their point pools, emphasizing
the salience of prosocial behavior even when there is monetary incentive to ignore it.
Participant’s perceived social similarity was also related to prospective social
behavior. Specifically, learned social values were related to preferences of interacting
with each person in the future. Faces with higher social values (more generous people)
were more preferred than those with lower values. This suggests that the traits that
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subjects learned through the value learning task generalized to a separate context, namely
their expectations of future social behavior based on this acquired knowledge.
The analysis of individual differences indicated one trend that replicated across
the two experiments, but only reached marginal significance in each. Namely, there was a
correlation between sensitivity to value type during learning and in the social preference
ratings. Subjects that were more accurate at choosing faces based on their social values
(when reward values were equal) on the last day of learning compared to choosing faces
based on their reward values (when social values were equal) tended to be more sensitive
to social values than rewards values in their future preference ratings, such that there was
a larger differential between ratings for high and low social value faces compared to that
between high and low reward value faces. Additionally, subjects that were more accurate
at reward value choices were more sensitive to reward value information in the
preference ratings, and subjects that were about equally accurate were equally sensitive to
each value type.
The main implication of these findings is that face spaces initially organized by
perceptual features can be warped by learned abstract information. For familiar others,
information beyond that which is readily available in the sensory input, namely that
acquired through former experience, can influence the representational structure of
person-specific knowledge. Moreover, people use the learned social traits to inform their
expectations of an individual’s social behavior. Our study cannot determine whether the
visual face and abstract social information becomes integrated into a single multidimensional space, as perceptual similarity was orthogonal to value similarity by design.
That said, the integration of social value and facial identity information would allow for
efficient recognition of people and associated traits, which could be used to guide further
social interactions and decisions.
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5. Supplemental Material
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Figure 2.S1
Correlation between perceptual and objective value DMs. By design, perceptual
similarity was orthogonal to the experimentally-defined (objective) values associated
with each face. Each point represents one face pair, black line indicates linear trend.

Figure 2.S2
MDS solution of pairwise similarity based on perceptual similarity ratings (N = 20).
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Figure 2.S3
Individual learning accuracy for reward (x-axis) and social (y-axis) value learning on
each day of learning (each point represents one subject). Colors in all plots indicate kmeans cluster grouping on Day 4, and is intended to visually depict the general
consistency across days 2 – 4 for subjects to have higher accuracy for a given value type
compared to the other.
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Figure 2.S4
Relationship between perceptual, pre-learning behavioral, and post-learning behavioral
similarity judgments across participants. Pre-learning similarity (center) was related to
perceptual similarity, but post-learning (right) was not. Each point represents one face
pair.
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Figure 2.S5
Relationship between subjective value rankings and objective values across participants
(each point represents one face pair).
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Figure 2.S6
Relationship between objective value DMs and behavioral similarity DMs. Post-learning
behavioral similarity was related to object social values, but not reward values. Prelearning behavioral similarity was not related to either value type. Each point represents
one face pair, linear trend (black line) shown for visualization purposes.
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Figure 2.S7
Individual differences in value learning (on Day 4) and changes in behavioral similarity
judgements (free sorting task) as a function of value type in Experiment 1. Positive
values correspond to a tendency towards social value information compared to reward
value information. The positive correlation was marginally significant, but this trend did
not replicate in Experiment 2. Each point represents one subject, black line corresponds
to linear trend.
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Figure 2.S8
Social preference similarity results (N = 30). Group-level similarity based on social
preference ratings was related to subjective social value (upper left plot), objective social
values (lower left), and post-learning behavioral similarity (middle right). There was no
relationship between social preference similarity and subjective reward value (upper
right), objective reward value (lower right), or pre-learning behavioral similarity (middle
left). Each point represents one face pair, black line indicates linear trend.
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Similarity Measure
Post-learning behavioral
Subjective social
Subjective reward
Social preferences

r(34)
.03
-.03
-.03
.03

p
.853
.85
.887
.865

Table 2.S1
Correlation between perceptual similarity and other measures.

Value
Social
Reward

High
Medium
Low
High
Medium
Low

M (SEM)
5.39 (0.45)
3.6 (0.39)
2.53 (0.4)
4.89 (0.48)
3.67 (0.39)
2.96 (0.49)

Table 2.S2
Social preference group-level results. Average ratings for each value type and level shown,
note that results for one value type are averaged over the other (e.g., each social value is
averaged over low, medium, and high reward values).
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III. NEURAL REPRESENTATIONS OF FACE-VALUE
ASSOCIATIONS
1. Introduction
In Chapter 2 it was found that value learning modulated behavioral similarity face
spaces, and social values in particular determined how spaces were re-organized after
learning. Although central to social behaviors, how such abstract social information is
associated with individual visual face identities in the brain is not well-understood. What
is the neural organization of abstract and perceptual person-specific knowledge?
Previous neuroimaging research on social cognition has focused on general
aspects of person information, such as localizing regions involved in processing social
conceptual knowledge (Zahn et al., 2007, 2009, 2017) or those involved when thinking
about others compared to thinking about the self (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Bzdok et al.,
2012; Schurz et al., 2014, 2021). For example, studies using functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) have examined brain activity during judgments of personrelated properties (e.g. “brave”, “assertive”, “tactless”), and compared resulting regions
with those evoked during object- or animal-related property judgments (Mitchell,
Heatherton, & Macrae, 2002; Zahn et al. 2007). Together, this work has pointed to a
network of brain regions that underlie learning and memory of such social information,
including the anterior temporal lobe (ATL), prefrontal cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, and
temporoparietal junction (Saxe, 2006; Frith, 2007). Converging evidence from studies on
patients with frontotemporal dementia (FTD) has indicated a dissociation between
general knowledge of social concepts and societal norms in the lateral, superior ATL and
motivation to act in accordance with those norms and understanding the consequences of
inappropriate social conduct in the orbitofrontal and prefrontal cortices (Zahn et al., 2009,
2017).
On the other hand, research on visual face processing has established a network of
regions in the occipital, temporal, and frontal cortices that contain neuronal populations
selective for face information (Grill-Spector, Weiner, Kay, & Gomez, 2017; Rapcsak,
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2019). Neuroimaging studies have provided evidence that when viewing faces compared
to other visual objects, including face-like non-face stimuli, there are higher neural
responses in these regions (Kanwisher et al., 1997; Haxby et al. 1999, Gauthier et al.
2000; Hoffman & Haxby 2000; Weiner & Grill-Spector, 2010). Moreover, damage to
these regions can impair face detection and recognition, such as prosopagnosia (Barton,
Press, Keenan, & O’Connor, 2002). While ventral areas such as the occipital face area
(OFA) and fusiform face area (FFA) have been implicated in the detection and
recognition of faces, dorsal regions such as the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS)
are thought to process more dynamic face information, such as emotional expressions
(Fox et al. 2009; Duchaine & Yovel, 2015). Face identity in particular has been linked to
ventral face-selective regions in fMRI studies with adaptation paradigms (Grill-Spector,
Weiner, Kay, & Gomez, 2017).
Recently it has been proposed that the association of face identity with other types
of person knowledge in memory occurs at late stages of visual processing, particularly in
face-selective parts of the medial and ventral ATL (Olson, McCoy, Klobusicky, & Ross,
2013; Collins & Olson, 2014). The medial and ventral ATL is anatomically well situated
to link information between earlier face-processing regions and memory for abstract
social knowledge, as it has reciprocal connections with more posterior parts of the
fusiform gyrus involved in face processing, as well as memory-related regions such as the
superior, lateral ATL, temporal pole, orbitofrontal cortex, and entorhinal and perirhinal
cortices connected to the hippocampus. Although the human homologue of a ventromedial ATL face-selective patch found in macaque monkeys has been established (Tsao
et al., 2008; Rajimehr et al., 2009; Jonas et al., 2016), it can be difficult to identify using
functional neuroimaging due to signal susceptibility artifacts and drop-out due to
proximity to the sinuses (Devlin et al., 2000; Jezzard & Clare, 1999).
At the same time, neurophysiological and neuroimaging studies have provided
evidence that responses in this area to faces are not solely driven by visual input and are
sensitive to familiarity manipulations. Single-unit neuronal recordings in the ventral
anterior inferior temporal cortex of macaques have shown view-point invariant
representations of face identities (Eifuku et al., 2011) and selectivity for learned
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associations between faces and abstract patterns (Eifuku et al., 2010). fMRI studies using
both face images and proper name presentation have found greater activation for famous
and non-famous familiar individuals compared to unfamiliar people in the ATL and
medial temporal lobe regardless of the stimulus type (Ross & Olson, 2012; Elfgren et al.,
2006). Moreover, multi-voxel pattern methods have revealed successful classification of
face identity (Kriegeskorte, Formisano, Sorger, & Goebel, 2007; Nestor, Plaut, &
Behrmann, 2011) and of learned associations between biographical information and faces
in the ATL (Tsukiura et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2017). Neuropsychological studies on
patients with associative prosopagnosia have shown that ATL damage can result in
deficits in remembering information about friends and celebrities even though face
perception is intact (Rice et al., 2018), and right ATL lesions in particular have been
associated with impaired knowledge of biographical information as well as feelings of
familiarity when re-meeting others (Gainotti, 2007a,b; Borghesani et al., 2019). Notably,
ATL damage impairs face memory and identification, not face perception, as well as the
ability to form new word-picture associations (Sharon et al., 2011; Gainotti & Marra,
2011; Olson et al., 2013). Taken together, face-selective parts of the ATL may be
responsible for integrating person-specific visual and social information between
perception and memory.
That said, fMRI studies examining social category perception of faces have found
some evidence that social impressions linked to perceptual features can bias activity in
earlier visual regions than the ATL. Specifically, social categories cued by visual face
features (e.g. age, race, gender) have been related to neural responses in face-selective
regions along the fusiform gyrus (Hughes et al., 2019, Freeman & Johnson, 2016;
Reggev et al., 2020). For example, one study found that faces of stereotypically
overlapping social categories (e.g., happy/female, angry/male) evoked more similar
multi-voxel activity patterns in a region of the right fusiform gyrus (Stolier & Freeman,
2016), suggesting that face representations in this area were influenced by stereotype
associations. At a behavioral-level, these stereotypes were related to biases in mousetrajectories during active social categorization of these faces. Thus, associations of social
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and visual face information are related to responses in early to mid-stages of the face
processing system, at least when the social categories are cued by visual facial features.
In the present study, we examine which neural systems are involved in processing
social information tied to specific individuals. Specifically, we had people learn
personality traits (generosity) associated with different faces through an interactive task
and tested whether there were brain regions whose activity patterns were modulated by
learning. As opposed to former studies that have primarily looked at pre-existing person
knowledge (e.g., famous faces) and social information derived from visual features (e.g.,
ingroup/outgroup stereotypes), we examine how learning associations between abstract
social values and face identities can dynamically influence neural responses.
To examine changes in the representational structure of different brain regions we
utilize multi-voxel activity pattern similarity analyses in conjunction with a whole-brain
roaming searchlight method (Kriegeskorte, Goebel, & Bandettini, 2006; Kriegeskorte,
Mur, & Bandettini, 2008) as well as independently localized face-selective regions-ofinterest (ROIs). We had people learn associations between faces, social values
(generosity), and reward values (points) via a multi-day learning task. Before and after
learning, fMRI data was collected as participants viewed the faces and performed a
repetition detection task that was independent of the learned value information. The
similarity of neural activity patterns for each pair of faces was calculated and compared
to social, reward, perceptual, and behavioral similarity measures. This allowed us to
locate regions whose activity patterns tracked the learned values after learning, even
during a value-unrelated perceptual task, as well as those that were related to the
behavioral and perceptual similarity judgments. Additionally, we examined individual
differences in learning behavior, social preference ratings, and neural changes in resulting
regions.
The results of this study elucidate the neural basis of person-specific social traits
when face-value associations are learned. Crucially, the experimental design involved
characterizing face spaces before and after learning, which allowed us to measure the
properties by which they were warped and the neural structures whose population
responses were related to this re-organization.
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2. Methods
All subjects, stimuli, and behavioral procedures were those described in Chapter
2, Section 2 (Experiment 1).
2.1 Scanning Procedures
Participants completed one neuroimaging (fMRI) scan session the day before the
first day of learning (pre-learning) and one scan session the day after the last day of
learning (post-learning). Each scan session consisted of five main functional runs and
were equivalent with the exception of three additional localizer runs collected in the prelearning session (except for two subjects who completed them in the post-learning
session). The session including the functional localizers was about 1.5 hours long, while
the other session lasted about 1 hour. During scanning, stimuli were presented using a
Dell Latitude laptop and custom Matlab scripts with Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli,
1997).
2.1.1 Main experiment. Across the five main runs subjects performed 1,000
trials of a one-back repeat detection task (200 trials per run). On each trial, participants
viewed one face at the center of the screen with a gray background and pressed two
buttons (one with each thumb) simultaneously if the face was identical to the one that
immediately preceded it (10% of trials). The face image was presented for 1.5 seconds,
followed by a 0.5 sec blank screen. On 90 trials, a blank gray screen was shown instead
of a face; baseline activity was modeled using these trials. The onset of each trial was
time-locked with each TR (2 sec). The order of stimuli was determined by a de Bruijn
sequence in which each image follows every image at the same frequency, and each
subject viewed the same pseudo-randomized order before and after learning. 90 trials
were used to model activity patterns for each face within a scan session.
Crucially, this task was unrelated to the learned values. In order to perform the
task, people simply needed to recognize each face and compare it to the one on the
former trial. Thus, any neural signature related to the learned values would be activated
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when viewing and comparing the faces, due to the associations formed during the
learning task.
2.1.2 Independent face localizer. To functionally localize face-selective regions
in the visual system we utilized the fLoc functional localizer package (Stigliani, Weiner,
& Grill-Spector, 2015). This included three runs in which participants viewed blocks of 8
gray scale images within a given category (faces, places, objects, or scrambled), and
performed a one-back repeat detection task (10 second blocks, 0.75 sec image
presentation & 0.25 sec ISI; 146 TRs per run with 2 sec TRs). Face images included both
adult and child portraits, in various head viewpoints and screen locations within a
bounded square in the center of the screen with a phase-scrambled background; the
remaining screen area was a uniform gray background.
2.2 MRI Scan Acquisition
Subjects were scanned on a 3T Siemens Prisma MRI scanner with a 32-channel
head coil. Anatomical scans were obtained using a high-resolution T1-weighted
MPRAGE sequence (voxel size = 1.0 x 1.0 x 1.0 mm). Functional runs were obtained
with a T2-weighted gradient-echo echo-planar imaging (EPI) multi-band sequence (TR =
2 s, TE = 30 ms, FOV = 19.8 x 19.8 cm, voxel size = 2.0 x 2.0 x 2.0 mm, flip angle =
75°). B0 fieldmap images were constructed using magnitude (TR = 0.6 s, TE = 4.1 ms,
FOV = 2.4 x 2.4 cm, voxel size = 3.0 x 3.0 x 3.0 mm, flip angle = 45°) and phase (TR =
0.6 s, TE = 6.6 ms, FOV = 2.4 x 2.4 cm, voxel size = 3.0 x 3.0 x 3.0 mm, flip angle =
45°) images collected at the end of the session.
2.3 Data Analysis
2.3.1 Pre-processing. Functional scan data was analyzed using FSL (Smith et al.,
2004) and in-house MATLAB scripts. Data were preprocessed to correct for slice-timing
and head motion (motion-censored TRs across subjects: M = 3.7%, SEM = 0.35%), highpass filtered to reduce low frequency noise, distortion corrected with the B0 fieldmap
image (except for one subject who did not have B0 scans), and co-registered to an
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anatomical scan collected at the beginning of the scan session. To normalize the data,
each volume was scaled by a constant factor such that the mean of each voxel’s time
series was equal.
2.3.2 First-level analysis. After pre-processing, data from the five main runs
were each analyzed with a general linear model (GLM) that included one regressor for
each face condition, one for repeat trials (trials in which the face matched the one that
preceded it), and motion parameters as covariates of no-interest, in order to estimate the
activity patterns (beta weights) for each face. Each participant’s data was modeled
individually. Pattern similarity analyses were conducted on unsmoothed data to retain the
highest level of spatial resolution available.
2.3.3 Localizer runs. For the localizer data, the same pre-processing steps as the
main experimental runs were used, with the addition of spatial smoothing (5mm Gaussian
kernel). For each run, a GLM was used to model responses to each stimulus category
(adult faces, child faces, car objects, instrument objects, corridor places, house places,
scrambled) and blank trials separately (with additional motion parameters), and a contrast
was used to find voxels whose responses were significantly higher for faces compared to
objects, places, and scrambled images. Results from the three runs were combined
within-subject using a fixed-effects model.
2.3.4 Cortical surface reconstruction. Within scan sessions, each subject’s
cortical surface was reconstructed based on their anatomical scan using Freesurfer
(Fischl, 2012). For each subject this yielded an outer surface (pial surface – grey matter
boundary) and an inner surface (grey matter – white matter boundary), consisting of
vertices and edges. These surfaces were aligned and resampled to a standard topology
using AFNI’s MapIcosahedron (implemented with PyMVPA; Hanke et al., 2009). This
resulted in surfaces for each subject and session with vertices (nodes) that correspond to
the same surface locations across sessions and people. Pattern similarity analyses could
then be performed on a node-by-node basis. To present group results, intermediate and
inflated surfaces were averaged across participants and visualized with AFNI and SUMA
(Cox, 1996; Saad et al., 2004).
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2.4 Whole-brain searchlight analyses
2.4.1 Voxel selection. All searchlight analyses were conducted using a surfacebased approach with the CoSMO-MVPA toolbox (Oosterhof et al. 2016) in MATLAB.
Surfaces with 64 linear divisions (40,962 nodes per hemisphere) were used. For each
surface node, grey matter voxels surrounding the node, constrained by the outer and inner
surfaces, were selected using a geodesic distance metric. This resulted in one searchlight
per node of approximately 100 neighboring voxels that followed the cortical anatomy of
the given participant. Unlike volume-based searchlights, surface-based definitions have
higher spatial sensitivity due to searchlights being constrained to grey matter voxels that
are anatomically adjacent, and as a result have been shown to be more sensitive to
measuring information in multi-voxel activity patterns (Oosterhof, Wiestler, Downing, &
Diedrichsen, 2011).
2.4.2 Pattern similarity searchlight. We first searched for brain regions that
contained information about the social or reward values after, and not before, learning. In
order to locate areas whose activity patterns tracked value similarity, a pattern similarity
analysis with a whole-brain roaming searchlight (Kriegeskorte et al., 2006, 2008) was
performed for each subject, scan session, and value type separately. Activity patterns
were averaged across the five runs for each face separately, and mean-centered by
subtracting the average activity pattern across face conditions from each face’s activity
pattern in order to remove a main effect common to all conditions (Diedrichsen &
Kriegeskorte, 2017). For each node/searchlight, neural dissimilarity matrices (DMs) were
constructed with a neural dissimilarity value for each face pair, computed as the pairwise
Euclidean distances of their corresponding activity patterns. Resulting neural DMs were
correlated with behavioral DMs derived from the subject’s post-learning value rankings
(pairwise differences between rank positions) using partial correlations to regress out the
other value type. The resulting correlation value was assigned to the given node, and this
was procedure performed for every node in the brain. The searchlight results were Fisher
normalized and then submitted to a group-level analysis to find clusters of nodes whose

43

positive correlation values post-learning were significantly higher than pre-learning,
corrected for multiple comparisons with a permutation approach (see below).
Additional searchlight analyses were run for each value type in which behavioral
DMs based on the perceptual similarity judgments (performed by a separate group of
participants) were regressed out using a partial correlation method. This allowed us to
compare the original searchlight maps with those that controlled for any effect of the
perceptual similarity of the faces. In other words, this tested for the unique influence of
value information on changes in neural patterns apart from the faces’ visual similarity.
The same approach was used to locate regions whose activity pattern similarity
was related to the free sorting similarity results. For each subject, their behavioral DMs
were compared with their neural similarity within each session separately as well as
between pre- and post-learning sessions.
2.4.3 Permutation procedure to assess statistical significance. To locate
clusters of significant nodes across subjects and correct for multiple comparisons, we
performed a Monte Carlo permutation procedure with Threshold-Free Cluster
Enhancement (TFCE; Nichols & Smith, 2009) for each test separately (using CoSMoMVPA). First, null datasets were generated by randomly shuffling the cells of the given
target behavioral DM and then running the same searchlight analyses described above
(repeated 100 times for each subject separately). Then, the original statistics from a
paired t-test (between sessions) or a one-sample t-test against 0 (within session) were
weighted with TFCE (based on cluster extent and effect size) and compared with a null
distribution of TFCE values based on 10,000 iterations of randomly selecting from the
null datasets and performing the same test, producing a corrected map. All reported
statistics for a given analysis reflect this value.
2.5 Region-of-interest analyses
In order to examine neural activity patterns within face-selective regions of the
visual system, the independent localizer data was used to define three regions in each
hemisphere for each subject separately: the occipital face area (OFA), posterior fusiform
face area (FFA), and mid-fusiform face area (FFA-2; Fig. 3.S1). These regions comprise
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the ventral ‘core’ face network (Grill-Spector, Weiner, Kay, & Gomez 2017). For each
subject, the resulting t-statistic map from the contrast of faces to other visual conditions
(objects, places, and scrambled images) were projected onto their surface models using
AFNI and SUMA, and each region-of-interest (ROI) was drawn by selecting
corresponding nodes on the surface using SUMA. The number of nodes in each ROI
were approximately equal across subjects (Table 3.S1).
Pattern similarity analyses were run for each subject and ROI separately. Surfacebased searchlights were defined for each node within a given ROI as a set of neighboring
gray matter voxels surrounding the node, and the same similarity analyses described
above were performed. Five searchlight sizes were used (100, 80, 60, 40, or 20 voxels),
to address the possibility that any failure to find an effect of value was not due to the
spatial resolution of the searchlights. Similarity results were averaged across searchlights
within an ROI, and a paired t-test was used to assess differences between pre- and postlearning across subjects.
2.6 Partial correlation
For several searchlight analyses, additional partial correlations were used to
control for the effects of co-varying measures (also using CoSMo-MVPA). Each of these
utilized the same approaches described above (i.e., Euclidean distance metric to compute
the neural DM, and Spearman correlations to assess the relationship between neural and
behavioral DMs).
3. Results
3.1 Whole-brain pattern similarity analyses to locate regions with neural activity
patterns modulated by learned values
To address the question of whether learned associations between visual face and
abstract social information were reflected in modulations of neural responses in the visual
system, we used multi-voxel pattern similarity analyses combined with whole-brain,
surface-based searchlight methods to analyze fMRI data collected while participants
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viewed face images and performed a one-back repeat detection task of face identity.
fMRI data was collected once before and once after participants completed the value
learning task, and the pre- and post-learning scan sessions were identical with the
exception of additional localizer scans in one of the two sessions (pre-learning session for
all but two subjects). Notably, the main scan task did not require any learned value
information to perform, thus any presence of value information in the evoked activity
would be independent of an explicit value-based task.
Subjective value similarity, based on post-learning behavioral value rankings, was
used to locate regions whose activity patterns were related to social or reward values
after, and not before, learning. For each participant, a behavioral dissimilarity matrix
(DM) was constructed from their rankings, such that each cell contained a dissimilarity
value for a pair of faces (the difference between their rank; Chapter 2). Resulting
behavioral DMs were used to predict neural similarity for pairs of faces within pre- and
post-learning scan sessions (i.e., the neural DM for a given searchlight was correlated
with the participant’s behavioral DM), for social and reward values separately. A paired
t-test between resulting pre- and post-learning pattern similarity maps (Fishertransformed, Spearman correlation values for each surface node) with permutation-based
multiple comparisons correction (threshold-free cluster enhancement, TFCE) was used to
assess which regions at a group-level were modulated by the learned value information.
Additional searchlight similarity analyses were performed to compare neural
activity patterns with behavioral similarity (free sorting task) and perceptual similarity,
within and between scan sessions. Within session comparisons involved a t-test against 0
with TFCE.
3.1.1 Social Value
We first examined regions in which the similarity of activity patterns for pairs of
faces was influenced by their social value similarity. Across subjects, clusters within the
left ventro-medial ATL contained multi-voxel patterns that had a significant, positive
increase in their correlation with subjective social values as indicated by a paired t-test
(Peak node: post > pre-learning M = .12, SEM = .05; Table 3.1; Fig. 3.1, left; Fig. 3.S2).
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In this area, face pairs with more similar social values evoked more similar activity
patterns after learning. This was the only region in the visual system that incorporated the
learned social information, and extended between the anterior fusiform gyrus and the
anterior collateral sulcus, consistent with the location of the anterior temporal face patch
as found by previous functional neuroimaging studies (Weiner et al., 2010; Tsao,
Moeller, & Freiwald, 2008; Goesaert & Op de Beeck, 2013; Nasr & Tootell, 2012; Pinsk
et al., 2009; Von Der Heide, Skipper, & Olson 2013; for review, see Collins & Olson,
2014), as well as the medial ATL. There was no relationship between reward value
similarity and neural activity patterns at the peak node in this region after learning (post >
pre-learning M = .01, SEM = .05). Additionally, no significant regions were found in a
whole-brain searchlight using the objective social value DM.

Social Searchlight Results
Post > Pre-Learning

R

L
ATL Dissimilarity Matrix
Post > Pre-Learning

.18

N = 28
.08

Figure 3.2
Social similarity searchlight results. Left: A whole-brain searchlight analysis found that a
region in the left anterior temporal lobe contained activity patterns whose similarity after
learning was related to social value similarity, compared to before learning. Right: the
group-level dissimilarity matrix is based on activity patterns across nodes in the region.
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Location

Surface
area (mm)

Post-Pre Post-Pre
M (SEM) Max

p-value
M

Anterior fusiform gyrus + collateral sulcus

97

.12 (.05)

.15

.023

Medial temporal pole

59

.12 (.05)

.15

.036

Table 3.2
Social similarity cluster results in the left ATL (N = 28). Aggregate results calculated
across searchlights.

To test for perceptual face information in these regions, a whole-brain searchlight
analysis with the perceptual DM was performed (see Section 3.1.4), and results for the
peak searchlight node in the left ATL region was examined. Activity pattern similarity
was predicted by perceptual similarity in the post-learning (M = .05, SEM = .04), but not
pre-learning (M = -.01, SEM = .03) session; however the difference between sessions was
not significant (t(29) = 1.24, p = .226).
3.1.2 Reward Value
Whole-brain searchlight similarity analyses based on the post-learning reward
value rankings showed one significant region that tracked reward value similarity after
versus before learning, located in the left posterior, inferior parietal cortex (Table 3.2;
Fig. 3.2). This suggests that the learned social values selectively modulated the activity
patterns in the left ATL. An additional whole-brain analysis using the objective value
DM showed only one region in the parietal cortex (Table 3.S2; Figure 3.S3).
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L

Reward Similarity
Post > Pre-Learning

.14

.11

N = 28

Figure 3.3
Reward similarity searchlight results.

Peak location

Surface area
(mm)

Post-Pre
M (SEM)

Post-Pre
Max

p-value
M

L. Inferior Parietal Cortex (posterior)

127

.12 (.001)

.14

.029

Table 3.3
Reward similarity cluster results (N = 28). Aggregate results calculated across
searchlights in the left IPC region.

3.1.3 Behavioral similarity
In order to relate each individual’s behavioral similarity judgments with neural
activity pattern similarity, we ran additional whole-brain searchlight analyses using the
behavioral DMs based on the free sorting task. Within pre- and post-learning sessions,
the behavioral DM based on the pixel-wise distance between pairs of faces was correlated
with the pairwise neural activity pattern DM. Resulting similarity maps were compared
between sessions.
A large cluster in the left inferior parietal cortex was found to have a significantly
greater relationship between behavioral and neural similarity in the post-learning,
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compared to pre-learning session (Fig. 3.3). This extended between the angular gyrus
(AG) and the supramarginal gyrus (SMG). Additional clusters were found in the right,
posterior middle temporal gyrus, right insular cortex, and right, inferior precentral gyrus.
No significant results were found comparing pre > post-learning (Fig. 3.S4), or
within pre- and post-learning sessions.

L

R

.14

N = 30

Behavioral Similarity
Post > Pre-Learning

.06

Figure 3.4
Behavioral similarity searchlight results.

Peak location
L. Inferior Parietal Cortex
R. Middle Temporal Gyrus (posterior)
R. Insula
R. Precentral Gyrus

Surface area
(mm)
851
247
396
54

Post-Pre
M (SEM)
.09 (.001)
.1 (.002)
.1 (.001)
.1 (.001)

Post-Pre
Max
.14
.14
.14
.11

p-value
M
.022
.02
.022
.038

Table 3.4
Behavioral similarity cluster results (N = 30). Aggregate results based on all searchlight
nodes in the given cluster.
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3.1.4 Perceptual similarity
The final whole-brain searchlight similarity analysis examined regions whose
activity patterns were related to the perceptual DM (constructed using results from a
separate group of subjects who performed the free sorting task explicitly using the
physical similarity of the faces). Within pre- and post-learning scan sessions there were
several clusters along the ventral visual pathway with positive correlations; however, no
region reached significance (Fig. 3.S5).
Comparing post- and pre-learning sessions, there were three regions in the right
hemisphere whose activity patterns were positively related to perceptual similarity after
learning compared to before (Table 3.4; Fig. 3.4). No region had significantly higher
correlations in the pre- > post-learning comparison.

R

Perceptual Similarity
Post > Pre-Learning

.17

.05

N = 30
Figure 3.5
Perceptual similarity searchlight results (N = 30).
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Peak location
R. Inferior Temporal Gyrus (anterior)
R. Inferior Frontal Gyrus
R. Orbitofrontal Cortex

Surface area Post-Pre
(mm)
M (SEM)
259
.1 (.002)
206
.12 (.002)
95
.11 (.001)

Post-Pre p-value
Max
M
.13
.036
.17
.014
.12
.035

Table 3.5
Perceptual similarity cluster results (N = 30). Aggregate results based on all searchlight
nodes in the given cluster.
3.2 Relationship between neural changes in the ATL and individual differences in
learning behavior and preference ratings
We next sought to compare individual differences in sensitivity to social
information on the learning task with neural changes in the ATL regions due to learned
social values. For each participant, we calculated the change in social value similarity in
the left ATL region by subtracting the average correlation value across corresponding
nodes in the pre-learning session from that in the post-learning session (D similarity).
To quantify behavioral biases, we calculated a sensitivity measure based on
performance during the last day of learning (learning sensitivity), as well as in the
preference ratings (preference sensitivity). Each participant’s reward accuracy was
subtracted from their social accuracy, in order to measure an individual’s tendency to be
more accurate at choosing faces based on social information in the learning task.
Consequently, positive sensitivity values correspond to better accuracy at choosing faces
based on their associated social values, compared to their reward values. We used this
measure, as opposed to using social accuracy alone, in order to differentiate participants
who had equivalent performance for each value type (e.g., 100% social, 100% reward),
from those who were selectively better for social values (e.g., 100% social, 60% reward).
Preference sensitivity was calculated by first calculating the average ratings for
high social value faces subtracted by the average ratings for low value faces (social value
sensitivity), as well as the average ratings for high reward faces subtracted by those for
the average low reward faces (reward value sensitivity). The reward value sensitivity was
then subtracted from the social value sensitivity (preference sensitivity).
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To compare behavioral sensitivity measures with neural changes, we correlated
participants’ sensitivity with the change in neural-social similarity in the left ATL.
Spearman correlations were used because the behavioral results were not normally
distributed (see Chapter 2), and rank-ordering should be used to compare brain and
behavioral measures without assuming a linear relationship (Kriegeskorte et al., 2008).
The relationship between preference sensitivity and ATL similarity was significant (rs =
.43, p = .018; Fig. 3.5, right), such that the more sensitive a subject was to social values
in their preference ratings the greater the ATL was related to their social value DM after
compared to before learning. A positive correlation was found between learning
sensitivity and ATL similarity; however, this relationship was marginally significant (rs =
.33, p = .078; Fig. 3.5, left). Partial correlation analyses controlling for the opposite
behavioral sensitivity measure confirmed these results (rank-transformed;
preference/ATL: partial r = .39, p = .039; learning/ATL: partial r = .16, p = .408).

Relationship to Behavior

-1.0

1.05

1.05

0.85

0.85

Neural-Social Similarity
(post - pre)

Neural-Social Similarity
(post - pre)

(Left ATL peak node)

0.65
0.45
0.25
0.05
-0.5

-0.15

0.0

0.5

0.65
0.45
0.25
0.05
-10

1.0

-5

-0.15

0

5

10

Preference Sensitivity

Learning Sensitivity

Figure 3.6
Relationship between changes in social similarity in the left ATL (brainand behavior as a
function of value type (N = 30). There was a positive correlation between the change in
neural-social similarity compared to learning sensitivity (left) and preference sensitivity
(right); however, only the preference sensitivity comparison reached significance. Each
point represents one subject, black line indicates linear trend.
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3.3 Testing for learned value information in ventral face-selective regions
Our whole-brain searchlight analyses showed that learned social information
influenced activity patterns in the left ventro-medial ATL. While these results support
recent proposals of the role of the ATL face patch in memory and perception of other
people (see Introduction), they are at odds with findings of social category information in
activity patterns of earlier face-selective regions of the ventral visual processing
hierarchy evoked during face viewing, particularly in the right fusiform gyrus (see
Introduction). One cause of this difference may be due to the spatial resolution of the
searchlights employed here (although Stolier and Freeman (2016) used a comparable
searchlight size of 123 voxels). If a searchlight is too small or too large, it may lack the
ability to detect relevant activity patterns in a region. Relatedly, one previous metaanalysis showed that decoding classification success using multi-voxel patterns depends
on the number of voxels included, with earlier visual regions benefitting from a higher
voxel count than late visual regions (Coutanche et al., 2016). This suggests that the
distinguishability of activity patterns for regions of the visual system depends on the
spatial resolution of the searchlight. Additionally, while there is significant overlap in the
anatomical locations of ventral, visual face-selective regions across people (Grill-Spector
et al., 2017), there are nonetheless idiosyncratic differences in the precise location and
extent of these regions within individuals. Thus, the whole-brain analysis may have failed
to detect these regions due to the variance in spatial specificity across subjects.
To address these potential issues of spatial resolution (number of voxels) and
specificity (anatomical location), we performed ROI-based pattern similarity analyses
using individual ROIs derived from independent localizer data and tested multiple
searchlight sizes. For each participant, we localized three face-selective regions in each
hemisphere, which were manually drawn such that they were approximately the same
size across participants (see Methods). These were the occipital face area (OFA),
posterior fusiform face area (posFFA), and anterior fusiform face area (antFFA). For each
node in an ROI, activity pattern similarity for the set of voxels in the given searchlight
were compared to the participant’s subjective social or reward value DMs. Resulting
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correlation values were averaged across searchlights in an ROI, and a paired t-test was
used to test for changes in activity patterns related to learned values between pre- and
post-learning scan sessions. Searchlight sizes of 20, 40, 60, 80, and 100 voxels were used.
The results of this approach confirmed that there was no relationship of social or reward
similarity and activity pattern similarity between the pre- and post-learning sessions for
any of the ROIs tested (Fig. 3.6).
Next, we tested for perceptual and behavioral similarity with the activity patterns
in each ROI. Across voxel sizes for the posterior FFA ROI, there was a positive trend for
the correlation of perceptual and neural DMs to be positive and greater after compared to
before learning; however, this trend only reached significance in the 20-voxel ROI (Table
3.S3). In this region, faces that were more perceptually similar evoked more similar
activity patterns in the post-learning session. No other ROI had activity pattern similarity
related to the perceptual DM, and no ROI had a significant relationship between neural
and behavioral similarity (Fig. 3.S6).
Together, these results support the notion that the lack of relationship between
neural and social similarity in the core face network, namely regions along the fusiform
gyrus, found in this study is not due to spatial constraints based on how searchlights were
defined. This provides further evidence that associations of abstract social information
with faces are encoded in neural responses at late stages of face processing (ATL face
patch) and suggests that prior evidence for social information in the posterior fusiform
gyrus was primarily driven by perceptual face features related to the social categories
studied.
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-0.06
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posFFA antFFA
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Figure 3.6
Results of ROI similarity analysis. Difference between post- and pre-learning similarity
values (averaged across searchlights, and across participants), error bars indicate +/SEM. There was no modulation of learned social values (left) or reward values (right) on
activity patterns in any ROI tested (N = 28).
4. Discussion
In this study we examined the influence of learned face-value associations on
neural activity. Former work had found evidence that learned associations between face
identities and person-specific information (e.g., biographical information) recruited faceselective parts of the ventro-medial anterior temporal lobe (vmATL). However, recent
functional neuroimaging (fMRI) studies have also found that social category information
(e.g., stereotype biases) are related to the similarity of activity patterns in earlier face
processing regions along the fusiform gyrus (see Introduction). We tested whether
learning associations between faces and abstract social information influenced activity
pattern similarity in the visual system. Visual-social associations for individual faces
were learned during the experiment and fMRI data was collected before and after
learning. This allowed us to examine changes in neural activity evoked by learning unlike
studies probing pre-existing knowledge. Moreover, the social values utilized (personality
traits) were not defined by perceptual features, and by design perceptual similarity was
orthogonal to the similarity of the learned values. Thus, any influence of learned values
on neural activity patterns would be separable from visual face information.
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We found that activity patterns in the left vmATL when viewing faces were
influenced by learned social values, such that after learning faces of more similar social
values evoked more similar activity patterns in this region. This was true even though
during fMRI scanning participants were performing a task unrelated to the learned
values. Furthermore, the magnitude of this change was related to an individual’s
sensitivity to the social, compared to reward, values in assessing their preference to
interact in a future social context. In other words, expectations of social behavior in
future interactions were associated with the encoding of social information in the left
vmATL. There was a trending relationship between accuracy as a function of value type
on the last day of learning and the magnitude of change in neural similarity, but this did
not reach statistical significance. These findings support the notion that the left vmATL
encodes person-specific information learned through interactive experience.
Using both whole-brain roaming searchlight and localized region-of-interest
(ROI) approaches, it was found that social value information was not related to activity in
the occipital face area (OFA), posterior fusiform face area (posFFA) or anterior fusiform
face area (antFFA), across multiple ROI sizes. This suggests that abstract social
information is not incorporated in responses in these ‘core’ face processing regions,
which is contrary to models that posit high-level social cognitive processes (namely in
the ATL and orbitofrontal cortex/OFC) bias perceptual representations in these regions
(Freeman & Johnson, 2016; Brooks & Freeman, 2019; Freeman, Stolier, & Brooks,
2020). Evidence for these claims come from studies showing differences in fusiform
gyrus activity for in-group compared to out-group members based on race (Van Bavel,
Packer, & Cunningham, 2008), as well as greater activity pattern similarity for more
stereotypically ‘overlapping’ social categories during both passive viewing and active
social categorization (Stolier & Freeman, 2016, 2017). Notably, the social categories in
these experiments are depicted by facial features (e.g., race, emotional state, gender), and
in the latter cases the implicated fusiform activity is contiguous with a large cluster
centered on the early visual cortex (Stolier & Freeman, 2016, 2017). Thus, it could be
that biases in face-selective fusiform regions are driven by perceptual features that cue
the social categories (Mason, Cloutier, & Macrae, 2006), as opposed to top-down
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feedback from higher-level stages. In Stolier and Freeman (2016), a similarity analysis
was performed while controlling for the visual similarity of the faces based on three
models (HMAX layer C2, image silhouette, and pixel-intensity maps), and significant
clusters were found in right medial temporal lobe3 and left OFC, but not in the fusiform
gyrus. Another important difference between these studies and the present study is that
we examine activity evoked by specific faces, but the former averages activity across
unique exemplars for the social categories.
Behavioral similarity judgments of the faces after learning were related to neural
similarity in a large region of the left inferior parietal lobe (IPL), inclusive of the angular
gyrus (AG) and supramarginal gyrus (SMG). This area has been implicated in encoding
psychological distance across domains such as social, spatial, and temporal distance
(Parkinson, Liu, & Wheatley, 2014). Interestingly, activity pattern similarity in the IPL
has been linked to social distance metrics derived from social networks, such that pattern
similarity during tasks such as viewing audiovisual movies and explicit judgments of
familiar individuals is related to social network measures such as the number of mutual
friends between individuals (Peer, Hayman, Tamir & Arzy, 2021; Hyon, Kleinbaym, &
Parkinson, 2020; Parkinson, Kleinbaum, & Wheatley, 2018, 2017). Our results build on
these findings by showing that subjective judgments of face similarity incorporate
learned social information, and the spatial organization of face similarity spaces by social
traits predicts activity pattern similarity in the left IPL. This shows how the neural (IPL)
and behavioral coding schemes for representing familiar others can be structured by
social information and can be revealed by distance-based measures.
That social and behavioral similarity were not related to neural similarity in the
same regions might be surprising, as behavioral similarity was correlated with social
similarity at a group-level (Chapter 2). One likely reason for this is that some subjects
incorporated the reward values (or both values) into their behavioral similarity spaces, so
the spatial distances between faces were not strictly determined by social values at an
3

Stolier and Freeman (2016) claim that this region is in the right fusiform gyrus, however, the group result
map and MNI-coordinates provided in the paper do not indicate the fusiform gyrus and instead lie more
superior and anterior.
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individual-level (whereas the social similarity was based on similarity rankings when
participants were explicitly instructed to use the given value). Neural analyses were
conducted at the subject-level, such that a participant’s activity patterns were compared
to their specific behavioral similarity spaces. In this way, although both regions are
anatomically situated between areas that process sensory input and those involved in
decision-making, activity patterns in the IPL were related to value information relevant to
subjective judgements of similarity, while those in the left vmATL were only modulated
by social information.
Reward value similarity was related to a region in the left posterior parietal
cortex, primarily situated in the posterior intraparietal sulcus (IPS). This result replicates
prior work showing the involvement of the parietal cortex in processing task-reward
associations (Wisniewski et al., 2015; Kahnt et al., 2014), and underscores the
representation of reward values independently of a task requiring those rewards. There
are several potential explanations for why reward information was not found in the left
vmATL. The vmATL could incorporate person knowledge in a selective manner, such
that socially relevant properties are encoded in the same region as other knowledge about
a person (e.g., face identity, name) but socially irrelevant information such as point
magnitudes specific to an experimental task are not (but see Rice et al., 2018; Eifuku et
al., 2010). Additionally, there is evidence for category- and modality-based subdivisions
of the ATL (Skipper et al., 2011; Hung et al., 2020; Persichetti et al., 2021), and taskdependent involvement of the ATL during object-based size judgments (ATL is required
when making conceptual judgments of size, but not perceptual; Chiou & Lambon Ralph,
2016). Consequently, reward value information may be represented in the ATL when
relevant to the task at-hand and potentially in an ATL area other than the vmATL face
patch.
In conclusion, the present study shows how personality traits associated with face
identities can modulate neural representations of others in face-selective parts of the left
vmATL, and these changes are related to expectations of social behavior of others
beyond the learning task. Together with former studies, our findings suggest that the
vmATL has a task-independent role in integrating person-specific information across face
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processing (fusiform gyrus), social knowledge (superior, lateral ATL), and action and
decision-making (orbitofrontal, prefrontal) systems. This speaks against the claim that
social information associated with faces biases responses in earlier face-processing
regions in the fusiform gyrus via top-down feedback interactions, at least when social
characteristics are not directly cued by visual facial features.
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5. Supplemental Materials
Subject 6

Subject 7

Subject 13

Subject 30

Figure 3.S7
ROI localization for three representative subjects. Univariate results of the face-localizer
data displayed in red, ROIs outlined in purple. Thresholds determined within-subject for
approximately equivalent ROI sizes across subjects.

Hemisphere

Region

Number of surface
nodes (SEM)

LH

OFA
posFFA
antFFA

49 (3)
59 (2)
58 (3)

RH

OFA
posFFA
antFFA

52 (3)
68 (5)
58 (3)

Table 3.S6
Number of surface nodes across subjects for each manually drawn ROI (based on
independent localizer data). Results shown for the occipital face area (OFA), posterior
fusiform face area (posFFA) and anterior fusiform face area (antFFA) in the left and right
hemispheres.
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Social Similarity
Post > Pre-Learning

.18

.08

L

R

Figure 3.S8
Social similarity searchlight results. All depicted regions had significant positive
correlations after, compared to before, learning (N = 28).
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Objective Reward Similarity
Post > Pre-Learning
L
.12

.08

Figure 3.S9
Objective reward similarity searchlight results (N = 30).

Peak location

Surface area Post-Pre
(mm)
M (SEM)

Post-Pre
Max

p-value
M

L. Supramarginal Gyrus

92

.12

.038)

.11 (.001)

Table 3.S7
Objective reward cluster results (N = 30).
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Behavioral Similarity
Pre > Post-Learning

.14

.05

L

R

Figure 3.S10
Behavioral similarity searchlight results for the pre > post-learning comparison. No
cluster reached significance; there was one cluster that was marginally significant in the
right inferior frontal gyrus (red arrow)
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Perceptual Similarity
Pre-Learning

.17

.05

L

R

Post-Learning

.11

.05

Figure 3.S11
Perceptual similarity searchlight results within pre- (top) and post-learning (bottom) scan
sessions. No cluster reached significance.
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Figure 3.S12
ROI similarity analysis results comparing neural with behavioral (upper) and perceptual
(lower) similarity, within pre- (left) and post-learning (right) scan sessions (N = 30).
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Hemisphere

Region

Voxel Count

Paired t-test

LH

posFFA

100
80
60
40
20

t(29) = 1.37, p = .182
t(29) = 1.62, p = .116
t(29) = 1.78, p = .086
t(29) = 1.93, p = .063
t(29) = 1.95, p = .061

RH

posFFA

100
80
60
40
20

t(29) = 1.7, p = .1
t(29) = 1.7, p = .1
t(29) = 1.67, p = .1
t(29) = 1.81, p = .081
t(29) = 2.09, p = .046

Table 3.S8
ROI-based perceptual similarity results comparing pre- and post-learning sessions (N =
30). All other comparisons for perceptual, social, reward, and behavioral similarity across
ROIs did not reach significance.
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IV. INFLUENCES OF VALUE LEARNING ON PERCEPTUAL
DISCRIMINATION
1. Introduction
In Chapters 2 and 3 it was found that learning associations between values and
faces modulated behavioral and neural similarity measures, such that the social value of
generosity had an influence on both explicit similarity judgements and the similarity of
activity patterns in face-selective brain regions during face perception. A question that
follows from these findings is whether behavioral face perception is also affected by the
learned value information. In the present study, we examine whether modulations of
behavioral and neural face spaces by learned values influences perceptual processing
when values are irrelevant for task performance. Moreover, only face stimuli were
employed previously, and to address the open question of whether effects are domainspecific (i.e., are exclusive to faces due to social traits being characteristic of animate
beings) we also tested associations between values and inanimate objects (flowers).
Our paradigm is based on existing literature on categorical perception. In these
studies participants typically learn to categorize novel stimuli based on arbitrary category
labels and the categories utilized are correlated with perceptual features that vary across
stimuli. Studies have found that after learning, members of different categories are better
discriminated from one another compared to members of the same category, suggesting
that between-category items become further apart in representational space (e.g.,
Goldstone, 1994c; Folstein, Gauthier, & Palmeri, 2012; Folstein, Palmeri, & Gauthier,
2013; Goldstone, Kersten, & Carvalho, 2017). Importantly, participants become more
sensitive to the perceptual information that distinguishes between-category members
because it is relevant for the explicit categorization judgments, not necessarily because
they are unable to learn the within-category structure (Levering & Kurtz, 2014). Here, we
test whether learning to categorize faces based on social trait information results in
categorical perception of faces, particularly when the traits are not determined by first
impressions but instead through experience. If learned social categories modulate the
structure of perceptual representations, then biases due to these categories should be
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found even in a perceptual task that does not require explicit social judgments, and for
traits that are learned through experience.
Crucially, stimulus sets were constructed using a morphing procedure, such that
all pairs of stimuli shared an equal amount of perceptual variance, and value categories
were correlated with a particular visual dimension. To examine whether learned values
modulated perceptual representations, we measured performance on a visual
discrimination task that was unrelated to the learned values, once before and once after
value learning. In this task, people sequentially viewed pairs of stimuli and reported
whether they were the “same” or “different”. We compared changes in discrimination of
pairs as a function of their associated values. If value learning modulates perceptual
spaces, then stimuli that have different values should be better discriminated after,
compared to before, learning. In other words, these items will become less similar to one
another and farther apart in space, and thus more distinct along the given value-relevant
dimension. Notably, this task does not explicitly require any value information, thus any
systematic influence of the learned values on visual discrimination performance cannot
be due to task demands.
We conducted three experiments to assess whether and how learning social traits
may influence perception. In Experiment 1, one group learned about four faces, and
another group learned about four flowers. Changes in perceptual discrimination
according to learned social and reward values were examined. Additionally, we
investigated individual differences in learning behavior and changes in discrimination, as
well as long-term value-related changes about one-month after learning. In Experiment 2,
only reward values were learned, in order to rule out the possibilities of within-category
modulations or training effects on changes in discrimination. In Experiment 3, we aimed
to replicate Experiment 1 using a within-subject design, and also examine explicit social
preferences for the stimuli in the context of the learning task and on a future cooperative
task. This served as a measure of how the learned information generalizes to propensities
in other types of social behavior.

69

2. Experiment 1
We first tested our main question of interest – whether learning social traits
modulates perceptual discrimination performance, and whether any effects are specific to
face stimuli. In Experiment 1, participants completed a training task in which they
learned social and reward values associated with four stimuli (faces or flowers).
Perceptual discrimination performance was examined before and after learning, in order
to test whether the learned value categories influenced discrimination performance
(categorical perception effect). Additionally, individual differences in the use of each
value type during learning and resulting changes in perceptual discrimination
performance were compared. Long-term changes in perceptual discrimination
performance due to value learning were also examined to establish whether any
modulations of representational spaces due to the learned values persisted over time.
2.1 Methods
2.1.1 Participants
Participants were recruited from the University of Pennsylvania to complete the
study online for course credit (20-30 mins). 32 participants were included in the face
condition (18-22, 9 males), and 32 were in the flowers condition (ages 18-22, 6 males;
see Supp. Methods for eligibility criteria and sample size estimation). The University of
Pennsylvania IRB approved all consent procedures.
2.1.2 Materials
All stimuli were generated by a morphing procedure. Four face images were
selected based on previous studies on category learning (Goldstone & Steyvers, 2001;
Goldstone, Lippa, & Shiffrin, 2001). Original face images were black-and-white
photographs of bald, male heads (Kayser, 1997), which were normed in a study by
Goldstone, Lippa, and Shiffrin (2001) and selected so that their average subjective
similarity ratings were within 20% of one another (based on ratings of a set of 62
70

images). These faces were matched in their race, gender, and approximate age, in order to
minimize the effects of these factors on task performance. Four flower images were
selected from a database of 45 flower images from Hula & Flegr (2016) such that they
had approximately equal beauty, complexity, and prototypicality ratings, and were front
facing with five petals each. Prior to morphing, the flower images were made black-andwhite.
For each condition (faces or flowers), the original images were morphed such that
four unique stimuli were generated for each condition, and each stimulus shared a portion
of its identity with two other stimuli (Morpheus Photo Morpher; Fig. 4.1, left).
Consequently, an equal amount of perceptual information is shared for within-category
and between-category pairs. Each stimulus contained equal percentages of two original
images (faces: 37.5%, flowers: 25%) and of a fifth image (faces: 25%, flowers: 50%;
percentages determined in pilot testing). All stimuli were 60 mm x 54 mm with a black
background.
2.1.3 Value learning procedure
In order to have participants learn two value types, we used a modified version of
a task from a previous study (Hackel, Doll, & Amodio, 2015). Participants were
instructed that the four stimuli were allocated different amounts of points (point pools)
and on a given trial they would donate a proportion of those points to the participant.
They were told to maximize the points they received from the stimuli by learning which
stimuli had larger average point pools than others, and which stimuli gave higher
proportions of their points on average. Reward value is operationalized as the average
magnitude of donated points (15 or 75 points), and social value is the proportion of the
point pool shared on average (20 or 80%). Values were orthogonally assigned to the four
stimuli, such that each stimulus shared its reward value with one stimulus and its social
value with another. There were two stimulus groupings such that the samereward/different-social value pairs in one grouping were the different-reward/same-social
value pairs in the other grouping (and vice versa; Fig. 4.S1). In each condition, there were
16 participants per grouping. Results were combined across groupings for all analyses,
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ensuring that any resulting categorical perception effect was not due to the specific
stimulus-reward value mappings.
Each participant completed 120 trials of value learning (Fig. 4.1, right). On a trial,
a fixation cross was presented (1 sec), followed by two stimuli presented side-by-side
(maximum 5 secs). Participants were instructed to choose either the left (F-key) or right
(J-key) stimulus using their keyboard, and to be as fast and accurate as possible when
responding (see Supp. Methods for full instructions). Once a participant made a choice,
they were presented with the point value of their choice for that trial, displayed under that
stimulus. If a participant did not make a choice in the allotted time, no feedback was
presented.
After a participant made a choice, they were shown two pieces of information
below that image: (1) how many points that stimulus shared with them on that trial
(reward value), labeled “Shared”, and (2) how many total points that stimulus had to
share on that trial (point pool), labeled “Out of”. For each trial, noise was added to the
reward and social values by sampling from a normal distribution centered on the value
(reward SD = 5, social SD = 0.05) and rounding up to the nearest integer. Point pools
were calculated by dividing the reward values by the social values for the given trial and
rounding up to the nearest integer.
Each pair of stimuli was presented 10 times (6 pairs total). Trials were divided
into 10 blocks of 12 trials. Each pair was presented twice within a block, and the trial
order within a block was randomized. Each participant received the same trial order and
trial values.
2.1.4 Perceptual discrimination procedure
Participants completed 72 trials of a same-different discrimination task (Fig. 4.1,
right), once before and once after the value learning task. In this task, they viewed pairs
of stimuli, presented sequentially one after another, and reported whether the two stimuli
were the same or different using the F-key and J-key on their keyboard. On a trial, a
fixation cross was presented (1 sec), followed by a stimulus (1 sec), then a black-andwhite noise mask (0.5 sec), and last a second stimulus with the prompt “Same (F-key) or
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Different (J-key)?” above the stimulus, which were displayed until a response was made
(max 5 secs). Participants were instructed to respond as fast and accurately as possible.
Across the 72 trials, each same-pair (4 total) was presented 6 times, and each
different-pair (4 total) was presented 12 times. Different-pairs consisted of stimuli that
shared part of their identity with each other (24 within-category pair trials, 24 betweencategory pair trials). Trials were divided into 6 blocks of 12 trials, and within each block
there were 4 same trials (one per pair) and 8 different trials (two per pair, once for each
possible presentation order within a pair). The order of trials was randomized within a
block, and the same trial order was presented for all participants.
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Figure 4.13
Experimental design. (Left) Morphing procedure used to generate stimuli. (Center)
Example of social and reward value assignments. In each experiment, stimuli in each
column were assigned the same reward value (15 or 75 points). In Experiments 1 and 3,
stimuli were assigned one social (20 or 80%) and one reward (15 or 75 points) value
indicated by the corresponding rows and columns. The same value mappings apply to
both faces and flowers. (Right) Sample trial events for perceptual discrimination and
value learning tasks. Feedback during value learning was presented for the given chosen
stimulus (left/right).
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2.2 Results
2.2.1 Value learning performance
Learning accuracy was calculated for each value-type separately in the second
half of learning (20 trials per value). For a given value, a correct choice is choosing the
higher-value stimulus, when presented with two stimuli that have different average values
of that type (e.g., one high- and one low-social value face) but share the same average
value of the other type (e.g., equal reward values). There was no difference between
social and reward value accuracy in the faces (social: M = 0.8, SEM = 0.03, reward: M =
0.8, SEM = 0.03; paired t(31) = 0.05, p = .959) or flowers (social: M = 0.72, SEM = 0.04,
reward: M = 0.72, SEM = 0.05; t(31) = 0.01, p = .990) conditions (Fig. 4.2, left).
Accuracy was significantly above chance performance (50%) for both value types and
conditions (Table S2). A mixed ANOVA revealed a significant effect of condition (faces
vs. flowers: F(1, 62) = 8.49, p = .005), but no effect of value type (reward vs. social: F(1,
62) = 0.001, p = .972) or interaction (value x condition: F(1, 62) < 0.001, p = .990). Ttests showed no difference between conditions for social (t(62) = 1.61, p = .113) or
reward (t(62) = 1.34, p = .187) values. This indicates that on average, people learned both
social and reward values to the same degree. While overall learning performance was
higher in the faces condition, accuracy did not differ between conditions when comparing
each value type separately.
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Figure 4.2
Value learning accuracy (% correct) across participants (N = 32 per faces/flowers
condition). Note that Experiments 1 and 2 compared faces and flowers between-subjects
(separate groups), while Experiment 3 was a within-subject design. Error bars represent
+/- SEM.
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2.2.2 Perceptual discrimination changes due to learning
Perceptual discrimination was measured using d’, separately for pre- and postlearning tasks and value types (Fig. 4.S2). Because the value types were orthogonally
assigned to the stimuli, we were able to examine changes in d’ performance for pairs with
different social values but the same reward value (social-relevant), and different-reward
pairs that shared the same social value (reward-relevant). There were no differences in
pre-learning d’ due to condition (faces/flowers) or value (social/reward) types (mixed
ANOVA: condition, F(1, 62) = 0.7, p = .406; value, F(1, 62) = 3.26, p = .076; interaction,
F(1, 62) = 0.2, p = .659).
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Figure 4.3
Change in discrimination performance due to value learning. Experiment 1 shows
discrimination changes for social-relevant (different-social/same-reward, “Social”) and
reward-relevant (different-reward/same-social, “Reward”) pairs of stimuli. Experiment 2
shows change in discrimination based on learned reward value categories. In Experiment
3, only reward values influenced discrimination performance (but see Exp. 3 Discussion).
N = 32 per condition. Error bars represent +/- SEM.

To calculate a measure of the change in discrimination due to value learning for
each participant, their pre-learning d’ was subtracted from their post-learning d’,
separately for social- and reward-relevant pairs (D d’ = d’post – d’pre). In both faces and
flowers conditions, discrimination performance was better for social- and reward-relevant
pairs after learning, indicated by positive D d’ across subjects (faces: social M = 0.34,
SEM = 0.15, reward M = 0.64, SEM = 0.14; flowers: social M = 0.63, SEM = 0.17,
reward M = 1.17, SEM = 0.13; Fig. 4.3, left; Table 4.S3). A mixed ANOVA showed a
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significant within-subjects effect of value-type (F(1, 62) = 14.07, p < .0001) and
between-subjects effect of condition (F(1, 62) = 5.6, p = .021), but no interaction between
value-type and condition (F(1, 62) = 1.11, p = .297). T-tests showed higher D d’ for the
reward-relevant dimension in the flowers condition compared to faces (t(62) = 2.77, p =
.007), but no difference between conditions for the social-relevant dimension (t(62) = 1.3,
p = .198). Paired t-tests indicated higher D d’ for reward-relevant pairs compared to
social-relevant pairs in the flowers condition (t(31) = 3.02, p = .005) and in the faces
condition (t(31) = 2.23, p = .033). These results indicate that learned social and reward
values influenced discrimination performance for both faces and flowers. Discrimination
performance was better for both value and stimulus types after learning, indicated by
positive D d’ in all cases, and there was a greater change for reward-relevant
discriminations than social-relevant discriminations within both stimulus conditions.
2.2.3 Individual Differences
We next examined whether there were individual differences in the categorical
perception effect as a function of learning behavior. Indeed, there were individual
differences in learning accuracy for each value-type in both conditions (Fig. 4.S3). To
quantify these differences, we calculated a measure of learning sensitivity for each
participant by subtracting their reward accuracy from their social accuracy (learning
sensitivity = accuracysocial – accuracyreward). If participants had a positive sensitivity
value, they were more accurate at choosing stimuli based on the learned social values
than reward values. If sensitivity was negative, they were more accurate at choosing
based on reward values than social values. If a participant had sensitivity around zero,
they were about equally accurate for both value types.
In order to compare an individual’s learning sensitivity to changes in their
discrimination performance, we also computed a measure of d’ sensitivity. We subtracted
each participant’s D d’ for reward-relevant pairs from their D d’ for social-relevant pairs
(d’ sensitivity = D d’social - D d’reward). In this case, a positive d’ sensitivity corresponds to
a greater change in perceptual discrimination for pairs along the social-relevant
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dimension compared to the reward-relevant dimension, while a negative d’ sensitivity is a
greater change for reward-relevant compared to social-relevant pairs. A d’ sensitivity
around zero indicates little or no difference in change along both dimensions.
Pearson correlations of the learning sensitivity and d’ sensitivity measures
revealed a significant positive correlation in the faces condition (r(30) = .41, p = .021;
Fig. 4.4, left) but not the flowers condition (r(30) = .08, p = .672; Fig. 4.4, right). This
shows how for faces, the difference between an individual’s accuracy for each value type
during category learning is related to the magnitude of change along each value-relevant
dimension in the perceptual discrimination task; a relationship that was not found for
flowers. Although the d’ sensitivity measure collapses across both value types and does
not differentiate between the directionality of changes for each value dimension
separately, additional analyses confirmed that while all participants got better at
discriminating reward-relevant face pairs, only participants with higher social value
accuracy than reward value accuracy got better at discriminating social-relevant pairs
(see Supp. Results, section 7.1.1; Fig. 4.S4).
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Figure 4.4
Individual differences in choice behavior during value learning and discrimination
performance in Experiment 1 (N = 32 within condition). A significant correlation was
found in the faces condition, but not the flowers condition. Each point represents one
participant; blue line indicates linear trend.
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2.2.4 Long-term perceptual changes
Last, we examined whether changes in perceptual discrimination performance due
to value learning had long-term effects. Approximately one month following their initial
session, we invited participants in both conditions to return for an additional online
session of the perceptual discrimination task (72 trials) for additional course credit or $5;
a subset of the original sample completed this task (faces: N = 16, average 34 days delay;
flowers: N = 10, average 32 days delay). For this group, their first session D d’ results
followed a similar pattern as the group-level results (Fig. 4.5); however, the effect of
value was marginally significant and the effect of condition was not significant.
Additionally, t-tests showed no differences between value types within or between
conditions (Table 4.S4).
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Figure 4.5
Change in discrimination performance for Experiment 1 participants who returned after a
one-month delay (faces: N = 16; flowers: N = 10). Error bars represent +/- SEM.

Just as before, each participant’s initial pre-learning d’ was subtracted from their
d’ measured after one-month (D d’ = d’delay-post – d’pre) for social- and reward-relevant
pairs separately (Fig. 4.5). When examining D d’ for faces after the delay, the positive D
d’ for reward pairs was comparable to the initial session (t-test against 0: t(15) = 2.6, p =
.02); however, the positive social D d’ effect was attenuated (t(15) = 0.47, p = .645; Table
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S5). For the flowers condition, D d’ after the delay was comparable to initial D d’ for
reward (t(9) = 4.08, p = .003) but slightly weaker for social (t(9) = 2.06, p = .069) pairs
(Table S5). Together, this shows how for both stimulus types the change in
discrimination performance for reward-relevant pairs persisted after the delay, but for
social-relevant face pairs the effect was diminished.
2.3 Discussion
Overall, we found that at a group-level, learned social and reward values
influenced discrimination performance for both face and flower stimuli. Reward value
categories were behaviorally relevant to the task of maximizing one’s accrued points,
thus the learned reward values influenced perceptual discriminations for both types of
stimuli. On the other hand, using the social values was not necessary to accomplish this
goal, although participants were told to learn them. Even though irrelevant to point
maximization, participants nonetheless learned the social values, and social values
influenced discrimination performance of both faces and flowers; however, unlike reward
values, this effect did not persist after a long-term delay.
When examining learning and discrimination performance at an individual-level,
differences between faces and flowers conditions emerged. Specifically, for faces there
was a relationship between an individual’s performance during value learning and
changes in perceptual discrimination as a function of value type. The extent to which
participants were more accurate at choosing faces based on their social values compared
to reward values during learning determined how much better they got at discriminating
faces that differed based on their social values. This relationship was not found in the
flower condition. This suggests that changes in face space were more sensitive to learning
performance than modulations of flower space.
3. Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we ruled out several alternative explanations of the main results
in Experiment 1. First, the increase in discrimination performance for both value types
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could be due to a training effect, in which performance improved over time for all items
with more practice. Instead of modulations relating to learned value categories, better
discrimination for all pairs could simply be due to being able to better perceive the
differences between the images. Second, the change in discriminations could be due to a
single value type. For instance, the different-social pairs are also same-reward pairs, thus
the changes could be due to both between- (different-reward) and within-category (samereward) modulations for reward values. Prior studies on categorical perception typically
have not found changes in discrimination for within-category comparisons; however, our
learning paradigm differs significantly from previous work. To address these concerns,
we sought to replicate the categorical perception effect using one value type. Participants
completed perceptual discrimination and value learning tasks, but the learning task was
modified such that participants only learned reward values and not social values. If
changes in discrimination are not due to training, and are not influenced by withincategory structure, then there should be no changes in discrimination of stimuli pairs that
share the same reward value.
3.1 Methods
3.1.1 Participants
Participants were recruited from the University of Pennsylvania and completed
the experiment online in about 20-30 minutes for course credit (see Supp. Methods for
exclusion criteria). The final sample included 32 participants in the faces condition (ages
18-22, 16 males), and 32 in the flowers condition (ages 18-33, 18 males). The University
of Pennsylvania IRB approved all consent procedures.
3.1.2 Value learning procedure
The stimuli and learning trials were the same as in Experiment 1, with the
exception that feedback on each trial only included reward values (i.e., there was no point
pool; Fig. 4.1, right). Prior to starting the task, participants were told that their goal was
to maximize their total accrued points by learning which stimuli had high, and which had
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low, average reward values. Two stimuli were assigned a low average point value (15
points) and two stimuli had a high average point value (75 points). For each trial, noise
was added to these values by randomly sampling from a normal distribution centered on
the given value (SD = 5) and rounding up to the nearest integer. Two groupings were
used to assign stimuli to value categories (Fig. 4.S1), such that the same-reward/withincategory pairs for one grouping were the different-reward/between-category pairs for the
other grouping (and vice versa). Within the face and flower conditions, there were 16
participants per grouping. Results were combined across groupings for all analyses.
Across 72 total trials, each pair of stimuli was presented 12 times (6 pairs total).
Trials were divided into 6 blocks of 12 trials, so that each pair was presented twice within
a block and each stimulus was presented on each side of the screen at an equal rate. The
order of trials within a block was randomized, and each participant viewed the same trial
order.
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Value learning performance
Accuracy was defined as choosing the stimulus with a higher average reward
value when presented with one low- and one high-value stimulus. In the second half of
learning (25 total trials), accuracy across participants was significantly above chanceperformance (50%) in both the faces (M = 95%, SEM = 1%; t(31) = 32.18, p < .0001) and
flowers (M = 94%, SEM = 2%; t(31) = 30.05, p < .0001) conditions (Fig. 4.2, center).
Accuracy was equivalent in the flowers condition compared to faces (one-way ANOVA:
F(1, 62) = 0.04, p = .841). This confirmed that participants successfully learned the
reward values associated with the stimuli in both conditions.
3.2.2 Perceptual discrimination changes
Discrimination performance was measured using d’ (Fig. 4.S5). As in Experiment
1, the change in d’ was calculated for each participant by subtracting their pre-learning d’
from their post-learning d’, separately for same- and different-reward pairs of stimuli (D
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d’ = d’post – d’pre). Note that the previous reward-relevant dimension is still relevant for
reward value categorization (different-reward pairs), but the social-relevant dimension is
now solely a within-category (same-reward) dimension. In both conditions,
discrimination performance for different-reward pairs improved, indicated by positive D
d’ across subjects (faces: M = 0.31, SEM = 0.12; flowers: M = 0.66, SEM = 0.16), but did
not change for same-reward pairs (faces: M = -0.12, SEM = 0.15; flowers: M = 0.09, SEM
= 0.2; Fig. 4.3, center; Table 4.S6). A mixed ANOVA confirmed a significant withinsubject effect of category membership (same- vs. different-reward; F(1, 62) = 16.97, p <
.0001), but no between-subjects effect of condition (F(1, 62) = 2, p = .162) and no
interaction of category and condition (F(1, 62) = 0.39, p = .536). Paired t-tests showed
significantly higher D d’ for different-reward compared to same-reward pairs in both
conditions (faces: t(31) = 2.49, p = .018; flowers: t(31) = 3.33, p = .002). There was no
difference between conditions for either category comparison (same-reward: t(62) = 0.8,
p = .425; different-reward: t(62) = 1.71, p = .093).
3.3 Discussion
For both faces and flowers, learned reward values influenced changes in
discrimination, such that items with different reward values were better discriminated
after learning, and there was no difference in performance for items with the same reward
value. This confirms that although our paradigm differs from category learning studies in
which participants learn to map category labels to stimuli, learned reward values produce
the same categorical perception effect, regardless of the type of stimulus (faces/flowers).
Learned values are used to group stimuli into categories, and this results in changes in
perceptual discrimination performance depending on whether the stimuli being
discriminated belong to the same or different reward value category. Notably, these
results establish that there are no changes in discrimination within value categories for
either faces or flowers. Thus, any modulation of the discrimination of these pairs by
learned information in Experiment 1 cannot be due to a training effect (overall
performance increases due to practice on the task) or within-category structure.
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4. Experiment 3
In Experiment 3 we sought to replicate the main results of Experiment 1 using a
within-subject design. We had a single group of participants learn social and reward
values associated with faces and flowers in one online session, counterbalancing the
order of stimulus conditions across participants. Additionally, we examined how learned
values generalized to self-reported propensities in social behaviors.
4.1 Methods
4.1.1 Participants
Participants were recruited from the University of Pennsylvania to complete the
study online for course credit or $10 (40-60 mins). 32 participants were included (ages
18-29, 12 males; see Supp. Methods for eligibility criteria). The University of
Pennsylvania IRB approved all consent procedures.
4.1.2 Procedure
The stimuli, values, and procedure were the same as in Experiment 1. Participants
performed pre-learning discrimination, value learning, and post-learning discrimination
tasks for one stimulus, and then repeated this for the other stimulus. The order of stimulus
type was counterbalanced across participants (N = 16 per order). The order of stimulus
grouping was also counterbalanced (N = 16 per grouping; N = 8 per order and grouping).
Afterwards, they completed preference ratings for each stimulus. They were asked
to rate on a scale of 1-7 how much they preferred playing with each stimulus during the
value learning task, and then how much they preferred to be paired with each stimulus in
a non-economic, cooperative puzzle-solving task if they were invited back for a future
study (based on Hackel, Doll, & Amodio, 2015). Surveys were conducted via Qualtrics.
One subject did not complete these surveys; thus, all reported analyses are based on 31
participants.
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4.2 Results
4.2.1 Value learning performance
Learning accuracy was calculated for each stimulus and value separately,
following the same approach as Experiment 1 (Fig. 4.S6). A repeated-measures ANOVA
showed a significant effect of condition (F(1, 31) = 19.11, p < .001), a significant effect
of value (F(1, 31) = 5.71, p = .023), but no significant interaction (F(1, 31) = 0.23, p =
.634). Unlike Experiment 1, paired t-tests showed significantly higher social (t(31) =
2.95, p = .006) and reward (t(31) = 2.11, p = .043) value accuracy in the faces compared
to the flowers condition. Additionally, in the faces condition there was higher accuracy
for reward values (M = 0.89, SEM = 0.02) compared to social values (M = 0.77, SEM =
0.04; t(31) = 2.42, p = .022; Fig. 4.2, right), while there was no such difference in
Experiment 1. This comparison was marginally significant in the flowers condition
(reward: M = 0.78, SEM = 0.06; social: M = 0.61, SEM = 0.05; t(31) = 1.78, p = .085).
Accuracy was significantly above chance performance (50%) for both value types and
conditions (Table S7). Mixed ANOVAs showed no effects of stimulus order in either
condition (Table S8).
4.2.2 Perceptual discrimination changes
As before, the change in discrimination performance was calculated for each
subject and value type separately (D d’ = d’post – d’pre). In both conditions, discrimination
performance was better for reward-, but not social-, relevant pairs after learning (Fig. 4.3,
right; faces: social M = 0.13, SEM = 0.13, reward M = 0.37, SEM = 0.13; flowers: social
M = 0.3, SEM = 0.17, reward M = 0.72, SEM = 0.14; Table S9). A repeated-measures
ANOVA showed a significant effect of value (F(1, 31) = 8.35, p = .007), with no effect
of condition (F(1, 31) = 2.2, p = .149) or interaction (F(1, 31) = 0.41, p = .528). Paired ttests indicated a significant difference between D d’ for reward-relevant pairs compared
to social-relevant pairs in the flowers condition (t(31) = 2.11, p = .043), and no difference
in the faces condition (t(31) = 1.49, p = .147). There were no differences between
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conditions for either value type (social: t(31) = 0.69 p = .493; reward: t(31) = 1.65, p =
.109).
At the same time, there was an effect of stimulus task order on changes in face
discrimination performance. A mixed ANOVA showed a significant between-subject
effect of order (F(1, 30) = 6.29, p = .018) on D d’, with no within-subject effect of value
(F(1, 30) = 2.25, p = .144) or interaction (F(1, 30) = 1.58, p = .219). When participants
performed faces first (Fig. 4.6, left), D d’ was significantly above zero for reward face
pairs (M = 0.7, SEM = 0.14; t(15) = 5.02, p < .0001) and marginally so for social pairs (M
= 0.26, SEM = 0.15; t(15) = 1.72, p = .105). Surprisingly, those that performed flowers
first had no change in face discriminations for either value type (social: M = 0.01, SEM =
0.20, t(15) = 0.03, p = .975; reward: M = 0.05, SEM = 0.18, t(15) = 0.25, p = .806; Fig.
4.6, right). Thus, a similar trend as Experiment 1 was found for those that completed the
faces condition first, while there were no changes in discrimination in the group that had
flowers first. There was no effect of task order on D d’ for flowers (Tables S10-S11).

Flowers first
1.0

0.8

0.8

0.6

0.6

0.4

0.4
Faces
0.2
Flowers
0.0

△ d'

△ d'

Faces first
1.0

0.2
0.0
-0.2

Faces
Flowers

-0.2

-0.4

-0.4
Social

Reward

Social

Reward

Figure 4.6
Change in discrimination performance in Experiment 3 separated by stimulus condition
order (N = 16 per order). There was an effect of order in the faces, but not the flowers,
condition. Error bars represent +/- SEM.
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4.2.3 Social preference ratings
In order to examine the influence of learned values on preferences, participants
rated each stimulus based on how much they preferred playing with them during the
value learning task (current), and how much they preferred to be paired with that stimulus
on a future, non-economic cooperative puzzle solving task if they were invited back for
another study (future). Preference ratings across subjects were examined for each
stimulus and corresponding value assignment (high/low and social/reward; Table S12).
Overall, participants preferred high value stimuli over low value stimuli (Fig. 4.7,
upper). A three-way repeated-measures ANOVA on preference ratings for the faces
condition showed significant effects of value level (high/low: F(1, 30) = 25.53, p <
.0001) and type (social/reward: F(1, 30) = 53.56, p < .0001), but no effect of time
(current/future; F(1, 30) = 2.35, p = .136) or significant interaction (Table S13). Within
current and future ratings, paired t-tests showed significant differences for each value
comparison except between low-social/high-reward and high-social/low reward faces
(current: t(30) = -1.71, p = .098; future t(30) = 0.58, p = .568; Table S14). This shows
that on average, participants used both social and reward value information to guide their
face preference ratings.
Paired t-tests indicated significantly lower ratings for low-social/low-reward faces
in the future, compared to current, context (t(30) = -2.06, p = .048), and a marginal
difference for low-social/high-reward faces (t(30) = 1.75, p = .09), with no difference
between current and future ratings for high-social/low reward (t(30) = -0.09, p = .928) or
high-social/high-reward faces (t(30) = 0.44, p = .662). This indicates that when
considering a future social context, preferences for low-social value faces decreased
across subjects, which suggests that participants tend to avoid faces that were not
generous to them during learning (low social value).
For the flowers condition, there were effects of time (F(1, 30) = 4.3, p = .047),
value type (F(1, 30) = 25.5, p < .0001), and value level (F(1, 30) = 6.54, p = .016) on
preference ratings, but no interactions (Table S13). T-tests indicated all pairwise
comparisons were significant except between low-social/low-reward and high-social/low86

reward (current: t(30) = 1.73, p = .094; future: t(30) = 1.48, p = .149), and between lowsocial/high-reward and high-social/high-reward (current: t(30) = 1.39, p = .174; future:
t(30) = -1, p = .327; Table S14). This suggests that social values did not influence
preference ratings in the flowers condition. There were no significant differences between
current and future ratings for any flower comparison, although the low-social/low-reward
comparison reached marginal significance (Table S15).
In order to examine whether preference ratings differed as a function of value
type on an individual basis, we calculated a preference sensitivity score for each
participant as follows:
Preference sensitivity = (mean(high-social) – mean(low-social)) –
(mean(high-reward) – mean(low-reward))
In this way, a positive score indicates a participant who was more sensitive to social
values in their preference ratings than reward values, while a negative score corresponds
to reward value sensitivity. Sensitivity was not correlated between faces and flowers
conditions (current: rs(29) = .29, p =.112; future: rs(29) = -.08, p =.663), indicating that
participants’ sensitivities in their preference ratings for one stimulus did not generalize to
the other stimulus type.
Comparing preference sensitivity with value learning sensitivity revealed
significant positive correlations with the current ratings for both faces (rs(29) =.16, p =
.01) and flowers (rs(29) = .7, p < .0001; Fig. 4.7, lower). For the future ratings, there was
a significant correlation in the flowers (rs(29) = .51, p = .004), but not faces (rs(29) =.17,
p = .352), condition. This shows that an individual’s performance during value learning
was related to their preferences during the task for faces and flowers, and for future
interactions with the flowers. Specifically, the difference in accuracy for one value
compared to the other predicted which values a participant was more sensitive to in their
preference ratings. For example, participants who are better at choosing high-social value
over low-social value faces during learning preferred high-social value over low-social
values faces more than their preference between high-reward and low-reward value faces.
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Preference sensitivity was not related to d’ sensitivity (D d’social - D d’reward) for
either faces (current: rs(29) =.17, p = .351; future: rs(29) = -.11, p = .541) or flowers
(current: rs(29) =.16, p = .383; future: rs(29) = -.02, p = .907). This may be due to the lack
of change in discrimination performance due to social value. Perhaps if social values
influenced D d’, as in Experiment 1, the d’ sensitivity measure would be related to
individual differences in participants preference ratings depending on value type.
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Sensitivity to social and reward values based on preference ratings (preference
sensitivity) in the context of the learning task (current) and a future cooperative task
(future), compared to value sensitivity during the learning task (N = 31). Each point
represents one participant. Solid line indicates linear trend.

4.3 Discussion
Together, these results indicate that while there was an increase in discrimination
performance relevant to learned reward values, the effect of learned social values on
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changes in discrimination performance found in Experiment 1 did not replicate at the
group-level. There are several differences between the experiments which may explain
this. First, there was a difference in learning accuracy for social and reward values in the
faces condition which was not found in Experiment 1. Specifically, participants had
higher accuracy for reward values than social values. This may have caused their
discrimination performance to increase for reward-relevant, and not social-relevant
discriminations. In other words, because participants were better at learning reward
values compared to social values, they became better at discriminating reward pairs and
not social pairs. Evidence to support this comes from the finding in Experiment 1 that
learning accuracy was related to the magnitude of change in social value-based face
discriminations. People who had higher reward value accuracy than social accuracy had
less change in discrimination performance for social-relevant pairs.
Additionally, there was an effect of stimulus task order on changes in
discrimination performance for faces. Participants who completed the faces condition
before the flowers condition had increased discrimination performance for both reward
and social pairs compared to those who completed flowers and then faces. Unexpectedly,
participants who completed flowers first had no change in face discrimination
performance for either reward or social values, even though there was no difference
between the two orders in learning accuracy or overall accuracy on the discrimination
task. Thus, the influence of task order on changes in discrimination performance may
account for the difference in results between Experiment 1 and 3.
Finally, there was a difference in pre-learning discrimination performance (d’)
between social and reward value stimuli that was not found in Experiment 1 (repeatedmeasures ANOVA: value, F(1, 31) = 6.91, p = .013; condition, F(1, 31) = 1.49, p = .231;
interaction, F(1, 31) = 0.62, p = .439; paired t-test reward vs. social: faces, t(31) = 1.79, p
= .083; flowers, t(31) = 0.49, p = .631; Fig. 4.S7). At baseline, participants were better at
discriminating reward face pairs compared to social pairs in Experiment 3 but not
Experiment 1. Because of this it may have been harder to learn the values associated
social pairs (exemplified by significantly lower learning accuracy for social value
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compared to reward value), and consequently there were no robust changes in face
discrimination performance due to the social values.
Apart from the main examination of discrimination performance, the additional
preference ratings allowed us to examine how people used the learned value information
in making preference judgments of each stimulus. In particular, we were interested in
whether and how the learned value information may generalize to expected behavior in a
separate social context. We found that across subjects, social and reward values were
factored into preferences for faces in the value learning task. People preferred faces with
high values the most, and low values the least, with no difference in preference for faces
with one high and one low value. On the other hand, social values did not influence
preferences for flowers during learning. Low reward stimuli were least preferred, and
high reward stimuli were most preferred, regardless of their associated social values. This
pattern was also found in future ratings of the flowers.
At an individual-level, while preferences of flowers were driven by their
associated reward values in both current and future ratings, the influence of value type on
preferences for faces depended on the task context. Future preferences of faces were
more influenced by low social values compared to preferences for those stimuli during
learning. Interestingly, ratings of low social value faces were lower in a future context,
suggesting an avoidance of faces that were least generous in the learning task. Similarly,
individual differences in value accuracy during learning were related to sensitivity to
each value type in the ratings of flowers regardless of task context, while this relationship
was only found for current, and not future, face preferences. Individual differences in
discrimination changes as a function of value type were not related to value sensitivity in
the preference ratings of either faces or flowers. This is potentially due to the lack of
influence of social values on discrimination changes.
5. General Discussion
In the present study, we examined whether learning to associate social trait
information with faces influenced perception. We employed a paradigm in which social
categories were not initially derived from physical face appearance, but instead were
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learned through an interactive task. Moreover, we examined effects of learning on
performance in a perceptual discrimination task that did not explicitly require any of the
learned information.
Experiment 1 revealed that learned social categories systematically influenced the
discrimination of faces as well as flowers. Importantly, this finding could not be
explained by differences in learning accuracy or pre-learning discrimination performance.
Individual differences in learning were related to the magnitude of this effect for faces
but not for flowers, such that the better people were at learning the social categories
compared to reward categories, the greater the change in their face discrimination
performance. A one-month follow-up discrimination test indicated that the effect of
social values on face perception had attenuated over time. Experiment 2 confirmed that
the main results in Experiment 1 were not due to a training effect, or within-category
modulations based on the reward values. Experiment 3 intended to replicate the results of
Experiment 1 using a within-subjects instead of a between-subjects design; however,
unlike in Experiment 1, there was no influence of social categories on face or flower
discrimination performance. Several differences between the experiments could account
for this, including lower learning accuracy for social values compared to reward values in
Experiment 3, an effect of task order on changes in discrimination, and significant
differences in pre-learning discrimination performance that were not found in Experiment
1. Aside from this, participants’ explicit ratings revealed that they used the social and
reward categories to guide their preferences for interacting with the faces; whereas only
reward categories influenced preferences of flowers. There was also a tendency to avoid
low generosity faces in the context of being paired with those players in a future,
cooperative task, with lower preference ratings compared to the context of the current
study. Together, these findings indicate that social category knowledge can bias face
perception, suggestive of a re-organization of perceptual space such that this information
becomes incorporated into the representational structure. Notably, these biases were
sensitive to learning performance in the faces condition, indicating that this effect was
only found for participants who attended to and learned the associated social categories.
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Our results show how perceptual face spaces can by dynamically modulated by
learning social traits, and such modulations are directly related to an individual’s learning
behavior. Moreover, the findings support the notion that social categories can
automatically influence face perception, even when people are not actively categorizing
the faces, though such effects are not persistent over a long-term delay. The current study
suggests that learned social information can influence perceptual face representations,
supporting the notion that both abstract and perceptual information can be linked in a
common underlying representational space, particularly when people learn associations
between physical resemblances and category structure.
Overall changes in discrimination performance were comparable between faces
and flowers. Although social traits are characteristic of animate items, people learned the
social values associated with flowers, and these associations influenced subsequent
perceptual performance (except for Experiment 3 participants who completed the flowers
condition before faces). We are certainly not the first to show that people can attribute
social properties to objects (for review, see Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000); the novelty of
these results instead is that learned social associations can influence perception of those
objects. These findings suggest that categorical perception effects are a domain-general
perceptual learning mechanism. Regardless of the type of stimulus, perceptual spaces are
warped by learned categorical groups that are relevant for behavior.
Notably, however, there was no relationship between a participant’s learning
behavior and discrimination changes for flowers as a function of value type. This
suggests that while social values influenced perceptual flower spaces, changes in these
spaces were not sensitive to differences in learning accuracy between social and reward
values. In other words, both social and reward categories became incorporated in the
organization of flower space, but the structure of flower space was not modulated in a
manner that was sensitive to learning behavior, as was found for face space. Additionally,
participants did not use the social values in their preference ratings of flowers, showing
that while there was an overall influence of social traits on perception, the traits did not
affect these explicit social judgments. Thus, while there were influences of learned values
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in both faces and flowers conditions, there were key differences in how learning was
related to perceptual space modulations as well as social preference ratings.
An important difference between the design of the present study and former work
on social vision is that previous studies have focused on first impressions of a face.
Visual appearance is especially relevant when characterizing unfamiliar faces in order to
classify them as belonging to meaningful social groups based on the information
available to the perceiver (physical features). Here, we have people learn associations
between physical face features and social trait categories, and in this way the faces
become familiarized. A central goal of our study was to examine how social
categorizations can influence face perception, but how familiar faces are recognized and
categorized may be different from the mechanisms involved in perceiving and
categorizing unfamiliar faces.
One limitation of this study is that social traits in the real-world do not correlate
with facial features like they do in the present study. We do not interpret our results as
evidence that people who are similarly generous will appear physically similar to a
perceiver. Instead, we designed the study in this way so that we could disentangle
perceptual similarity and category similarity. This paradigm allowed the examination of
whether social category learning could warp perceptual spaces. We show that when
people learn relationships between facial features and social categories, there are related
changes in how well those features can be perceptually discriminated. This provides
evidence that social concepts can influence perceptual descriptions and resulting
discrimination performance, as has been shown in the categorical perception literature.
Another limitation is that the study focuses on the single social trait of generosity. While
this allowed a careful examination of how category learning can modulate face space,
impressions are often based on multiple competing and often overlapping social
categories (Freeman et al., 2012; Stolier et al., 2018). Additional studies are needed to
better establish the conditions under which conceptual knowledge may penetrate
perceptual processes particularly in the case of social information associated with
individual people.
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In sum, the present findings show how learning social trait categories can
implicitly modulate face perception. The re-organization of perceptual face spaces by
such categories is directly tied to an individual’s learning behavior, and this learned
information generalizes to social expectations in a future context.

6. Supplemental Methods

6.1 Sample size estimation
An initial power analysis (alpha = .01, power = 95%) testing for a difference
between two independent means (based on the categorical perception effect in Folstein,
Gauthier, & Palmeri, 2012) indicated a sample size of 16 per condition (faces/flowers), or
32 total participants. This estimated N also allowed us to properly counterbalance the
assignment of condition (2) and stimulus groupings (2). Thus, in each experiment we had
32 participants per condition.
6.2 Exclusion criteria
6.2.1 Experiment 1. 52 participants were recruited to participate in the faces
condition, and 49 were recruited to the flowers condition. 14 in the faces condition, and
11 in the flowers condition were excluded for having a category learning accuracy lower
than 70% for both value types. An additional 6 in the faces condition and 6 in the flowers
condition were excluded for having less than 70% accuracy on either the pre- or postlearning discrimination tasks.
6.2.2 Experiment 2. 47 participants were recruited to participate in the faces
condition, and 55 were recruited to participate in the flowers condition. 9 participants in
the faces condition, and 8 in the flowers condition, were excluded for not reaching an
accuracy of 70% on the category learning task for both value types. Additionally, 6
participants in the faces condition, and 15 in the flowers condition were excluded for
having less than 70% accuracy on either pre- or post-learning discrimination tasks.
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6.2.3 Experiment 3. 50 participants were recruited to participate. 14 were
excluded for having a category learning accuracy lower than 70% for both value types,
and 4 were excluded for having discrimination performance below 60% pre- or postlearning, for either the faces or flowers condition.
6.2 Experiment distribution
All experiments were developed using PsychoPy3 and conducted online using the
Pavlovia.org platform.
6.3 Instructions
6.3.1 Same-different discrimination (All experiments)
In this task you will see two [faces/flowers], presented one after another at the
center of the screen. Your task is to report whether the two [faces/flowers] were the same
[faces/flowers], or different [faces/flowers]. To respond "same", press the F-key. To
respond "different", press the J-key. You will have a maximum of 5 seconds to respond.
Please try to be as fast and accurate as possible.
6.3.2 Category learning
6.3.2.1 Experiments 1 & 3: Faces
Now you will play a game where you learn about 4 people. Each person made a
series of choices about how to divide a pool of points between themselves and a future
person (i.e. you).
For each decision, we made a different pool of points available to each person.
Then they chose how many points to keep for themselves, and how many to donate to you.
On average, some people had larger point pools than others to work with (e.g. 10-400
points). Also, some people tended to donate more of their points than others on average
(e.g. 20-80% of their point pools).
Your job is to maximize the points you receive from the players. How much you
get depends on the points available to the person, and how much they chose to share with
you. Remember, you will have to learn which people had more points than others to give,
and which people gave more than others on average, in order to maximize your received
points.
On each round, you will see two people on the screen, your task is to choose who
to play with. Press the F-key to choose the person on the LEFT. Press the J-key to choose
the person on the RIGHT. You will only have 5 seconds to respond, you must respond in
that time for your answer to be recorded.
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After you make a choice, you will see two pieces of information: (A) how many
points they gave you on that round (labeled "Shared") (B) the total pool of points they
had on that round (labeled "Out of"). The points they gave you are then added to your
total number of points. Your goal is to maximize the total points you receive, by learning
who had more points than others, and who donated more points than others.
6.3.2.2 Experiments 1 & 3: Flowers
Now you will play a game where you learn about point allocations associated
with 4 flowers.
Each flower has an average point pool, either a small or large number of points
(e.g. 10-400 points), and each flower donates either a small or large proportion of their
point pool to you on average (e.g. 20-80%). For example, some flowers have large point
pools, but only donate small proportions of the points, others have small point pools and
donate large proportions.
Your job is to maximize the points you receive from the flowers. How much you
get depends on the points available to the flower, and how much they share with you.
Remember, you will have to learn which flowers have more points than others to give,
and which flowers have more than others on average, in order to maximize your received
points.
On each round, you will see two flowers on the screen, your task is to choose one
to play with. Press the F-key to choose the flower on the LEFT. Press the J-key to choose
the flower on the RIGHT. You will only have 5 seconds to respond, you must respond in
that time for your answer to be recorded.
After you make a choice, you will see two pieces of information:(A) how many
points it gave you on that round (labeled "Shared"). (B) the total pool of points it had on
that round (labeled "Out of"). The points it gave you are then added to your total number
of points. Your goal is to maximize the total points you receive, by learning which flowers
have more points than others, and which donate more points than others.
6.3.2.3 Experiment 2
Now you will play a game where you learn about 4 [faces/flowers].
You will see two [faces/flowers] at a time and you can choose to play with one of
the two. Each [person/flower] will give different amounts of points to you. Some
[people/flowers] will always give you a lot of points (75 on average), and some will
always give you a small amount of points (15 on average). Your job is to maximize the
total points you're receiving.
For each choice, you can play with the [face/flower] on the left, or on the right.
To select the [face/flower] on the LEFT, press the F-key. To select the [face/flower] on
the RIGHT, press the J-key. You will have a maximum of 5 seconds to respond and
potentially gain points.
After making a selection, the amounts for both [faces/flowers] are shown under
their pictures. You will only receive the point amount for the [face/flower] you chose.
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6.4 Stimuli

Grouping 1
15

Grouping 2

75

15

(20%)

(20%)

(80%)

(80%)

75

Figure 4.S1
Two groupings for each condition depending on assignment of values to stimuli in all
experiments (social and reward values in Experiments 1 & 3, reward values in
Experiment 2). Half of the participants received one grouping and half received the other
(N=16 for each, within a condition). All results were combined across these groupings.
6.5 Data cleaning
For all tasks, trials in which no response was made were removed from all
analyses. The percentage of trials with no response was low across subjects and
experiments (Table S1).
6.6 Data analysis
6.6.1 Discrimination performance. To account for extreme hit rate and false
alarm values when calculating d’, rates of 0 were replaced with 0.5 ÷ n and rates of 1
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replaced with (n – 0.5) ÷ n where n is the number of signal or noise trials (Macmillan &
Kaplan, 1985).

Experiment 1
Experiment 2
Experiment 3

Faces
Flowers
Faces
Flowers
Faces
Flowers

Perceptual
discrimination
(pre-learning)
0.04 (0.04)
0.2 (0.1)
1 (0.7)
0.1 (0.1)
0.07 (.04)
0.6 (0.5)

Category
Learning
0.6 (0.2)
0.4 (0.1)
0.6 (0.3)
0.4 (0.2)
0.7 (0.3)
0.6 (0.1)

Perceptual
discrimination
(post-learning)
0.04 (0.04)
0.04 (0.04)
0.2 (0.2)
0
0.09 (0.06)
0.3 (0.1)

Table 4.S9
Average percent of trials with no response across subjects for each task and condition
separately, SEM in parentheses.
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7. Supplemental Results
7.1 Experiment 1
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Figure 4.S2
Discrimination performance (d’; left) and accuracy across all trials (right; each point
represents one participant) for the same-different discrimination task in Experiment 1.
Error bars (left) represent +/- SEM. Solid line (right) indicates no change in pre- and
post-learning accuracy. N = 32 per condition.
Flowers

1

1

0.8

0.8

Social Accuracy

Social Accuracy

Faces

0.6
0.4
0.2
0

0.6
0.4
0.2
0

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

Reward Accuracy

0.8

1

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Reward Accuracy

Figure 4.S3
Social and reward value accuracy during category learning in Experiment 1. Plots show
individual performance for each value type, each point represents one participant, dashed
line indicates equal accuracy for both values. N = 32 per condition.
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7.1.1 Additional individual differences analysis
As the d’ sensitivity measure collapses across both value types, it does not
differentiate between the directionality of changes for each value dimension separately.
For example, a positive d’ sensitivity score could result from a greater increase in social
discrimination performance than reward discriminations, or a greater decrease in reward
discrimination performance compared to social discriminations. We determined whether
this effect was driven by differences in D d’ for social discriminations in the faces
condition.
Participants were grouped according to learning sensitivity; if they had a positive
sensitivity they were assigned to the Social group, if negative they were assigned to the
Reward group (Social N = 18, Reward N = 14). Examining D d’ by group confirmed that
there was a significant increase in discrimination for social-relevant pairs due to value
learning in the Social group (M = 0.45, SEM = 0.2; t-test against 0: t(17) = 2.32, p = .033)
and not the Reward group (M = 0.19, SEM = 0.23; t(13) = 0.84, p = .415; Fig. S4).
Reward-relevant discriminations were better after learning in both groups (Social: M =
0.56, SEM = 0.14, t(17) = 4.15, p = .001; Reward: M = 0.75, SEM = 0.27; t(13) = 2.78, p
= .016). A mixed ANOVA showed a significant effect of value type (F(1, 30) = 6.19, p =
.019) and a marginally significant interaction between value type and group (F(1, 30) =
2.88, p = .1), with no effect of group (F(1, 30) = 0.02, p = .893). These results suggest
that while all participants got better at discriminating reward-relevant face pairs, only
participants with higher social value accuracy than reward value accuracy got better at
discriminating social-relevant pairs. In other words, the relationship between learning
sensitivity and d’ sensitivity is primarily accounted for by individual differences in
perceptual changes associated with learned social values.
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Figure 4.S4
Change in discrimination performance for Social and Reward groups in Experiment 2.
Participants were grouped based on whether they had higher social or reward value
accuracy on the value learning task (Social N = 18, Reward, N = 14). A difference in
performance changes between groups was found only for social value-relevant
discriminations. Error bars represent +/- SEM.
7.2 Experiment 2
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Figure 4.S5
Discrimination performance (d’; left) and accuracy across all trials (right; each point
represents one participant) for the same-different discrimination task in Experiment 2.
Error bars (left) represent +/- SEM. Solid line (right) indicates no change in pre- and postlearning accuracy. N = 32 per condition.
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7.3 Experiment 3
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Figure 4.S6
Social and reward value accuracy during value learning in Experiment 3. Plots show
individual performance for each value type, each point represents one participant, dashed
line indicates equal accuracy for both values. N = 32.
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Figure 4.S7
Discrimination performance (d’; left) and accuracy across all trials (right; each point
represents one participant) for the same-different discrimination task in Experiment 3.
Error bars (left) represent +/- SEM. Solid line (right) indicates no change in pre- and postlearning accuracy. N = 32.
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7.4 Additional statistics
Significant effects displayed in bold.

7.4.1 Experiment 1
Condition

Value

Faces

Social
Reward

t(31) = 11.52, p < .0001
t(31) = 10.32, p < .0001

Flowers

Social

t(31) = 5.09, p < .0001

Reward

t(31) = 4.06, p < .0001

Table 4.S2
T-tests comparing category learning accuracy for each value type against chance
performance (50%).

Condition

Value

Faces

Social
Reward

t(31) = 2.29, p = .029
t(31) = 4.63, p < .0001

Flowers

Social
Reward

t(31) = 3.8, p = .001
t(31) = 9.06, p < .0001

Table 4.S3
T-tests comparing D d’ against 0 (no change).
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Test

Condition
Faces

T-test vs. 0

Paired t-test

T-test

Mixed ANOVA

Measure
Social

M = 0.47, SEM = 0.24

Reward

M = 0.64, SEM = 0.19

Flowers

Social
Reward

M = 0.75, SEM = 0.32
M = 1.21, SEM = 0.17

Faces

Social

t(15) = 1.98, p = .066

Reward

t(15) = 3.36, p = .004

Flowers

Social
Reward

t(9) = 2.3, p = .047
t(9) = 6.97, p < .0001

Faces

Social vs. Reward

t(15) = 0.78, p = .437

Flowers

Social vs. Reward

t(9) = 1.96, p = .081

Faces vs. Flowers

Social

t(24) = 0.68, p = .501

Faces vs. Flowers

Reward

t(24) = 2.02, p = .054

Value

F(1, 24) = 3.74, p = .065

Condition
Value*Condition

F(1, 24) = 1.93, p = .178
F(1, 24) = 0.81, p = .378

Table 4.S4
Session 1 results group that returned after ~1 month for a second session.
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Test

Condition

Measure

Faces

Repeated-Measures ANOVA

Paired T-Test

Repeated-Measures ANOVA

Paired T-Test

Social

M = 0.13, SEM = 0.28

Reward

M = 0.59, SEM = 0.23

Flowers

Social
Reward

M = 0.67, SEM = 0.33
M = 1.06, SEM = 0.26

Faces

Value

F(1, 15) = 1.9, p = .188

Session
Value*Session

F(1, 15) = 1.8, p = .199
F(1, 15) = 1.09, p = .312

Session1 vs.
Session2

Social

t(15) = 1.61, p = .129

Session1 vs.
Session2

Reward

t(15) = 0.27, p = .794

Flowers

Value

F(1, 9) = 7.6, p = .022

Session
Value*Session

F(1, 9) = 0.35, p = .569
F(1, 9) = 0.06, p = .806

Social

t(9) = 0.26, p = .801

Reward

t(9) = 0.76, p = .47

Session1 vs.
Session2
Session1 vs.
Session2

Table 4.S5
Session 2 results for group that returned after ~1 month for a second session.

7.4.2 Experiment 2
Condition

Value

Faces

Same-reward
Different-reward

t(31) = -0.75, p = .458
t(31) = 2.36, p = .025

Flowers

Same-reward
Different-reward

t(31) = 0.43, p = .668
t(31) = 4.12, p < .0001

Table 4.S6
T-tests comparing D d’ against 0 (no change).
7.4.3 Experiment 3
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Condition

Value

Faces

Reward
Social

t(31) = 17.53, p < .0001
t(31) = 7.08, p < .0001

Flowers

Reward
Social

t(31) = 4.86, p < .0001
t(31) = 2.5, p = .018

Table 4.S7
T-tests comparing learning accuracy against chance performance (50%).

Condition

Effect

Faces

Value
Order

F(1, 30) = 5.81, p = .022
F(1, 30) = 0.39, p = .539

Value*Order

F(1, 30) = 0.79, p = .38

Value
Order

F(1, 30) = 3.09, p = .089
F(1, 30) = 0.03, p = .865

Value*Order

F(1, 30) = 0.21, p = .652

Flowers

Table 4.S8
Mixed ANOVAs for learning accuracy (order (2) x value type (2)) within conditions.

Condition

Value

Faces

Social
Reward

t(31) = 1.05, p = .302
t(31) = 2.93, p = .006

Flowers

Social

t(31) = 1.67, p = .105

Reward

t(31) = 4.98, p < .0001

Table 4.S9
T-tests comparing D d’ against 0 (no change).
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Condition

Effect

Flowers

Value
Order
Value*Order

F(1, 30) = 4.36, p = .045
F(1, 30) = 0.36, p = .555
F(1, 30) = 0.48, p = .496

Table 4.S10
Mixed ANOVA for D d’ (order (2) x value type (2)).

Condition

Order

Value

Flowers

Faces first

Social
Reward

t(30) = 1.59, p = .132
t(30) = 3.4, p = .004

Flowers first

Social
Reward

t(30) = 0.67, p = .514
t(30) = 3.54, p = .003

Table 4.S11
T-tests comparing D d’ against 0 (faces first vs. flowers first).
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Condition

Time

Value assignment

M (SEM)

Faces

Current

Low-social/Low-reward
Low-social/High-reward
High-social/Low-reward
High-social/High-reward

2.71 (0.25)
4.58 (0.27)
3.84 (0.32)
5.58 (0.25)

Future

Low-social/Low-reward
Low-social/High-reward
High-social/Low-reward

2.39 (0.22)
4.13 (0.31)
3.87 (0.31)

High-social/High-reward

5.48 (0.27)

Low-social/Low-reward
Low-social/High-reward

3.36 (0.31)
4.87 (0.2)

High-social/Low-reward

3.9 (0.31)

High-social/High-reward
Low-social/Low-reward

5.32 (0.29)
3.71 (0.31)

Low-social/High-reward
High-social/Low-reward
High-social/High-reward

4.74 (0.25)
4.26 (0.31)
5.55 (0.22)

Flowers

Current

Future

Table 4.S12
Preference ratings for each stimulus in Experiment 3 across subjects (N = 31). Ratings
were made once in the context of the value learning task (Current), and once for
preferences for a cooperative task in a hypothetical future study (Future).
Condition

Effect

Faces

Value level * Value type
Value level * Time
Value type * Time

F(1, 30) = 0.17, p = .684
F(1, 30) = 2.92, p = .098
F(1, 30) = 0.17, p = .682

Value level * Value type * Time

F(1, 30) = 0, p = 1

Value level * Value type
Value level * Time

F(1, 30) = 0.07, p = .796
F(1, 30) = 0.44, p = .511

Value type * Time
Value level * Value type * Time

F(1, 30) = 0.47, p = .499
F(1, 30) = 0.75, p = .395

Flowers

Table 4.S13
Three-way repeated measures ANOVA of preference ratings.
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Condition

Time

Value
comparison

Faces

Current

Low-S/Low-R
Low-S/Low-R
Low-S/Low-R

Low-S/High-R
High-S/Low-R
High-S/High-R

t(30) = 5.36, p < .0001
t(30) = 3.12, p = .004
t(30) = 8.45, p < .0001

Low-S/High-R
High-S/Low-R
Low-S/Low-R

High-S/High-R
High-S/High-R
Low-S/High-R

t(30) = 3.05, p =.005
t(30) = 4.52, p < .0001
t(30) = 5.37, p < .0001

Low-S/Low-R
Low-S/Low-R
Low-S/High-R

High-S/Low-R
High-S/High-R
High-S/High-R

t(30) = 4.78, p < .0001
t(30) = 9.6, p < .0001
t(30) = 4.33, p < .0001

High-S/Low-R

High-S/High-R

t(30) = 5.2, p < .0001

Current

Low-S/Low-R
Low-S/Low-R
Low-S/High-R
High-S/Low-R

Low-S/High-R
High-S/High-R
High-S/Low-R
High-S/High-R

t(30) = 3.8, p = .001
t(30) = 4.67, p < .0001
t(30) = -2.21, p = .035
t(30) = 3.66, p = .001

Future

Low-S/Low-R
Low-S/Low-R
Low-S/High-R

Low-S/High-R
High-S/High-R
High-S/High-R

t(30) = 2.65, p = .013
t(30) = 4.77, p < .0001
t(30) = 2.88, p = .007

High-S/Low-R

High-S/High-R

t(30) = 3.35, p = .002

Future

Flowers

Table 4.S14
Paired t-tests comparing preference ratings between stimuli (S: Social, R: Reward).

Condition Value combination
Flowers

Low-social/Low-reward
Low-social/High-reward
High-social/Low-reward

t(30) = 1.88, p = .07
t(30) = -0.38, p = .707
t(30) = 1.07, p = .295

High-social/High-reward

t(30) = 0.75, p = .457

Table 4.S15
Paired t-tests comparing current versus future preference ratings for each stimulus.
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V. GENERAL DISCUSSION
This dissertation presents three studies that explore how learning associations
between perceptual and abstract information can warp psychological and neural
representations. The main goals were to: (1) examine how learning face-value
associations influenced behavioral and neural measures of face similarity; (2) test
whether learned information generalized across task contexts and stimulus types; and (3)
explore heterogeneity in learning, social preferences, and similarity metrics between
individuals.
In each chapter a value learning task was used to have participants interactively
learn associations between faces, social values, and reward values. Participants were
under the impression that they were learning about actions that other people had taken in
the same experiment. Remarkably, people learned social values even though they could
ignore this information and still perform successfully on the learning task. Additionally,
across cohorts there were individual differences in the extent to which participants were
accurate for each value type during learning and how they weighted the values when
making preferential judgments in the context of future social interactions.
Chapter 2 examined how learned values modulated behavioral similarity
judgments and social preferences. Subjects sorted faces in a spatial similarity space and
were free to use whatever information they thought relevant for the task. Before value
learning perceptual (visual) face similarity predicted the organization of face spaces at a
group-level. After learning, social, but not reward, values modulated the organization,
such that faces that were more similar in their social values were closer together. In this
way, the learned social trait of generosity selectively warped visual face spaces. The
similarity of social preference ratings for faces was related to their social but not reward
similarity. At a subject-level there was variance in how accurate participants were during
learning for choosing faces based on each value type, and how much they relied on social
and/or reward values in their similarity judgments as well as their social preferences.
These individual differences were consistent across learning, behavioral similarity, and
social preferences tasks.
110

Chapter 3 built on these findings by investigating whether and how learned values
modulated neural responses when viewing faces. Of particular interest was whether faceselective regions along the ventral visual pathway were biased by the learned value
information. Social values influenced the multi-voxel activity patterns evoked by faces in
an anterior ventro-medial face region of the left temporal lobe (vmATL), and the
magnitude of this relationship was related to individual learning performance as a
function of value type. These results support recent proposals that this anterior faceselective area is critically involved in associating person-specific information across
perception and memory and speak against theories that social information is fed-back to
earlier face processing regions (at least for abstract social information associated with
individuals and not perceptually cued social categories). Activity patterns in a region of
the left parietal cortex, previously shown to encode distance-based properties of a
person’s own social network, were related to an individual’s behavioral similarity space
after learning, suggesting this area has a role in representing socially relevant properties
of familiar others that can be revealed by spatial metrics.
Chapter 4 addressed the question of whether the behavioral and neural influences
of learned values found in Chapters 2 and 3 had implicit behavioral consequences in a
value-irrelevant discrimination task and probed whether effects were domain-general
(specific to faces or not). Learned social and reward values influenced perceptual
discrimination of both faces and flowers, and there was a relationship between individual
learning and discrimination performance as a function of value type in the faces condition
(but not flowers). Learned social and reward value were incorporated into social
preferences to interact with the faces, but only reward values influenced preferences for
the flowers. This shows initial evidence that while social values are selectively used when
making explicit behavioral judgements of faces (Chapter 2), implicit discrimination
judgements are influenced by both social and reward values in a domain-general manner.
However, the effect of learned social values on perceptual discrimination was not found
after one-month and did not replicate with a within-subject design (but see notable
between-experiment differences).
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Together, the results of these studies suggest that representations of individual
others that are initially structured by perceptual similarity can be dynamically modulated
by information that is not directly available in sensory input but instead is acquired
through experience. Chapters 2 and 3 provide novel evidence that learned social traits can
influence behavioral and neural responses to faces, even in the presence of additional
task-relevant properties (reward values), and even when performing a value-irrelevant
task (Chapter 3). This indicates that models that define face representations based on
physical features, such as in social trait impressions of unfamiliar faces (Oosterhof &
Todorov, 2008), are not sufficient to describe representations of familiar others with
whom an observer has acquired additional knowledge. As social concepts are typically
more varied and interrelated than the single trait studied in the present work (Freeman &
Ambady, 2009, 2011; Stolier et al., 2018, 2020), an interesting avenue for future research
is to examine how learning more complex associations, such as with multi-trait spaces,
could differentially warp face spaces, and how this may depend on an individual
observer’s prior conceptual beliefs (Stolier et al., 2018) and social context.
That the left vmATL represents social trait information about others in a taskindependent manner that is directly related to an individual’s learning behavior shows for
the first time that this region is recruited for face-trait associations acquired through
interactive experience. These results are in line with formulations of the semantic “hub”
model that posit the left ATL has a role in the storage and retrieval of semantic
knowledge and integrates information across modality-specific brain regions (Lambon
Ralph et al., 2010; Visser et al., 2010; Rice et al., 2018). At the same time, the
connectivity of the ATL to other cortical and subcortical systems has been shown to be
critical for social cognition and face processing (Tsukiura et al., 2010; Unger et al., 2016;
Hampton et al., 2016), and the role of the ATL as part of a wider network that supports
complex social processes remains to be fully understood (Wang et al., 2018; Wang &
Olson, 2018).
The present findings have broad implications for models in perception and
cognition. Prior work examining conceptual knowledge has largely focused on defining
fixed spaces and their underlying dimensions. For example, social perception and social
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cognition research has found that the dimensions that structure social knowledge are
stable across observers (e.g., warmth vs. competence, trustworthiness vs. dominance) and
posits that this is due to their adaptive, ecological benefits (see Introduction). However,
concepts and their use are context-dependent and recent computational models have
exemplified how the structure of conceptual representations can flexibly change
depending on what information is relevant for a given context (Solomon et al., 2019).
Future work on social perception and person knowledge should consider not only how
prior knowledge can bias current perceptions and judgments, but how it can be adaptively
updated by learned associations and how it may differ for familiar individuals.
Is social information special? At first glance, it may seem that the behavioral and
neural results suggest a selective influence of social value information compared to
reward value. At a group-level, social values influenced explicit behavioral judgements
(Chapter 2) and face-specific neural activity patterns in the visual system (Chapter 3), but
reward values did not. Indeed, some have argued that social information engages
specialized cognitive processes and recruits neural systems that selectively give rise to
social cognition (Adolphs, 2009; Brothers, 1996). Notably, in the current set of
experiments, social traits are a generalizable property that are associated with particular
faces, while the point rewards are task-specific, thus it can be expected that the learned
social traits would be persistent in contexts beyond the experimental task. In this way, the
behavioral and neural effects specific to social, and not reward, values may be explained
by their utility in predicting future behavior, and not necessarily due differences in the
type of information. In other words, if participants learned to associate reward properties
that are generalizable instead of task-specific, such as wealth categories (e.g., rich, poor),
then we may find similar behavioral and neural effects for reward information as was
found with social traits.
On the other hand, one study found that learning task-specific monetary rewards
associated with novel 2D objects modulates neural activity in early visual cortex (V1;
Persichetti et al., 2015). Moreover, learning to group morphed car stimuli into categories
defined by their visual features has been shown to influence perceptual discrimination
performance as well as responses in the lateral occipital cortex (LOC; Jiang et al., 2007)
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and ventral visual regions (Folstein et al., 2013). Presently, both social and reward value
categories affected behavioral face discrimination performance (Chapter 3), indicating
that reward value categories can implicitly influence perceptual judgements. Thus, the
absence of neural modulations in visual regions as a function of learned reward values of
faces may not be due to generalizability. Instead, the neural code for reward value
associations in the visual system may be revealed by fMRI-adaptation methods as was
found in these previous studies and not multi-voxel patterns as was tested here.
5.1 Limitations
Every study has limitations, the present ones not excluded. Arguably the most
critical in terms of their generalizability is that each study uses a single social trait and
faces that are matched in their perceptually-related social categories (e.g., age, race,
gender). While constraining the experimental design in this way allowed us to control
influences of visual and categorical information on the effects of-interest, the findings
cannot be directly applied to the broader space of person knowledge that contains social
categories beyond the limited set used here. Utilizing representational spaces reduced in
their dimensionality allowed us to tease apart modulations based on the different types of
information available to the participants, but it is important to note that this is a simplified
approach to studying person knowledge that realistically is richer and more complex. As
mentioned above, real-world social categories are overlapping and inter-related. Thus,
learning that someone is generous will likely impact impressions of other social attributes
associated with that person. Additional studies are needed to explore how such multidimensional spaces can be influenced by learning and under what contexts.
Another limitation is introduced by using a two-dimensional space to measure
behavioral similarity and orthogonalizing the perceptual and objective values. This
design was critical for measuring representational changes with visual stimuli in Chapters
2 and 3 while controlling for perceptual variance. In Chapter 2, it is impossible for
subjects to use all three orthogonalized perceptual, social, and reward values together in
their spatial behavioral similarity judgements. While this does not impact the finding that
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social values selectively modulated these behavioral spaces, we cannot rule out the
possibility that a task that allowed for multiple sources of information may produce
different results (e.g., a different weighting of each source of information, and different
corresponding brain regions). It is worth noting that multidimensional scaling (MDS)
techniques have shown that a two-dimensional configuration provides a good fit to the
similarity of judgments of social traits and increasing the dimensionality does not greatly
improve the fit (Rosenberg et al., 1968). However, in the present case it is nonetheless
impossible to utilize the three orthogonal dimensions in a two-dimensional space. Yet
another limitation of the spatial sorting method is that it assumes that the similarity
judgments are symmetric (the similarity of X to Y should equal to that of Y to X;
Goldstone, 1994), which to my knowledge has not been tested in research on social
impressions but could potentially be violated.
5.2 Conclusion
Understanding the ways in which past experience can predict present perceptions
and future actions, a hallmark of human intelligence, is a widely shared goal of
psychological research. As we come to learn about our world and other people our mind
and brain are tuned by learned conceptual relationships, allowing for dynamic and
efficient behavior as social beings. The mechanisms that allow for this are not likely
restricted to the domain of faces and person-knowledge, but instead are general processes
that allow us to take the plethora of information that arrives to us, parse and make
meaning of it, encode it in storage, and use it to make further abstractions, inferences, and
predictions.
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